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 1 Abstract 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis applies Complex Interdependence and International Society Theory for its analysis. The EU 
and Russia are comprehensively interdependent because of an extensive trade of natural gas from 
Russia to Europe. But the mutual dependency has proven to be problematic as Russia mixes its 
obligations as a supplier with its foreign policy agenda. The norms and values comprising the EU stand 
in stark contrast to Russia’s, which further stresses the oddness of this partnership and suggests that 
this is a trade-linkage out of necessity, rather than one of want. Moscow and its state-owned energy 
giant Gazprom has been deemed by some as an unreliable supplier to the EU due to Russia’s disputes 
with Ukraine and the subsequent gas cut-offs to Europe in 2006 & 2009. The situation has led the 
Commission to emphasise the un-built Nabucco Pipeline as its flagship project for the EU. A project 
strongly supported by an Eastern Europe that is over-dependent on Russian gas. The project however 
is for the most part met with an indifferent attitude by the larger most influential member states. The 
Western part of the EU stands in glaring contrast to the Eastern part as the Western EU has 
diversification firmly included in its energy security portfolio. Russia resurged as an influential 
international actor because of its hydrocarbon industry and it is rightly worried that EU diversification 
might change the necessary interdependence status quo. Moscow uses every form of legal, regulatory, 
political and economic mean to obstruct the Nabucco Project. But the EU itself is the main impediment 
to its implementation as it is split into two groups: those who believe the project is vital for Europe’s 
energy security and those who think of it as an expensive, unnecessary solution to a non-existent 
problem. 
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 5 Introduction 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The struggle for energy security has been waged since the invention of the combustion engine and the 
discovery of fossil fuels as a source of energy. Securing a nations energy needs is now a major focal 
point for the modern nation-state. Coal and oil were the first objects of affection in the energy struggle 
but natural gas has gained traction as a desirable source of energy. Gas is considered the cleanest fossil 
fuel, giving off 30% less CO2 than oil and 45% less CO2 than coal. Coal and oil are still the most widely 
used but gas is on the rise and currently constitutes about a quarter of the world’s total energy 
consumption (BP 2012, 41). New technological advances such as liquefied natural gas (LNG) have also 
made it easier and cheaper to transport over long distances and across oceans. 
But like all fossil fuels the supply is finite and natural reserves are very unevenly distributed between 
nations. The EU does not have the domestic energy resources needed to meet the demands of its 500 
million citizens and must therefore turn to imports. The reliance on foreign energy sources is 
substantial and some have estimated that within the next 20 years more than 70% of the gas 
consumed in the EU will have to be imported (Eurogas, 2007, p. 6). This projected increase represents 
a challenge for the EU as it needs to meet the consumption demand. Needless to say the situation is not 
overlooked by the various member capitals or by the European Commission. 
Russia has so far been a central part of the solution. Russia is a major producer of energy with some of 
the largest fossil fuel reserves in the world. It not only has the world’s 8th largest oil reserves but also 
by far the world’s largest gas reserves (BP 2012, 6;20). The close proximity of Russia and its abundant 
resources seemingly makes it a natural supplier to the EU. Russia currently supplies nearly 40% of the 
EU’s total gas imports (BP, 2012, p. 28) and this percentage is expected to rise. At first glance this is a 
mutually beneficial situation. Russia helps ensure that the EU can fulfil its high gas consumption need 
and simultaneously enables Russia to focus its exports westward towards the lucrative EU market. The 
mutual dependency however is not without its problems. The EU and its member states and Russia do 
not see eye-to-eye on foreign policy which has made the trade relationship somewhat strained. 
Russia’s stability as a supplier has also been put into question after the gas cut-offs to Europe in 2006 
and 2009 due to its disputes with Ukraine the primary transit country to Europe. It has made some EU 
member states vary of an overdependence on Russian gas. Particularly the newest members in Eastern 
Europe - which in some cases are 100% dependent on Russian gas - fear that Moscow will use this 
position as political leverage.  
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A diversification project has surfaced from private companies in the EU. It has been named the 
Nabucco Pipeline Project and it could possibly alleviate the EU’s dependency on Russian gas. The 
Nabucco Project is a pipeline scheduled to run from Austria in the heart of the EU, through Romania, 
Hungary, Bulgaria and neighbouring Turkey (See Figure 1-1). The pipeline could potentially enable the 
EU to gain access to some 
of the large gas reserves in 
the Middle East and 
Central Asia. The pipeline 
is supported by the EU 
Commission and is part of 
the so-called “Southern Gas 
Corridor” strategy1. The 
President of the EU 
Commission José Manuel 
Barroso is a staunch 
supporter of the Nabucco Project and Former EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs has called 
Nabucco “The flagship project of the diversification efforts of the EU for our security of supply” (Baev & 
Øverland, 2010, p. 1077). So even though the current Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger has 
been less enthusiastic about Nabucco’s importance the project is still a high priority for the EU 
Commission (Barysch, 2010, p. 9).  
Nabucco is met with little enthusiasm in Moscow if not with outright hindrance in mind. This is 
perhaps only natural as the Nabucco Project clearly aims to bypass Russia and lessen the EU’s 
dependence on Russian gas. The mutual EU-Russian reliance on the hydrocarbon trade will continue 
to be in effect but it appears Russia is more dependent on the EU than vice versa. Russian export to the 
EU is of the utmost importance to Moscow’s geo-political aspirations and the EU’s attempts at 
diversification are therefore perceived as a threat (Shleifer & Treisman, 2011, p. 126). The fact that 
Nabucco is looking for gas in the Caspian – in Russia’s back yard – makes it even less acceptable to 
Moscow. By emerging itself in the search for resources in the Caspian region, the EU is now part of the 
                                                             
1 The “Southern Gas Corridor” or simply “Southern Corridor” strategy is the EU Commission’s term for any 
pipeline project that can supply gas from Caspian and Middle Eastern sources (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008). The “Southern Corridor” is not a project in itself but rather a statement of intent from the 
EU Commission. The Nabucco Pipeline is an example of such a project. It stands in contrast to the “Eastern 
Corridor” which constitutes gas imports from Russia. The “Southern Corridor” will be covered in section 5.2 
“How the Nabucco Project could benefit the EU” 
FIGURE 1-1 THE ROUTE OF THE NABUCCO PIPELINE (SCHMITZ, 2010) 
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race for influence in Central Asia which has been dubbed “The New Great Game”2 (Baev & Øverland, 
2010, p. 1077).  
The Nabucco Project has been under development since 2002 and it has been questioned whether the 
project will ever be completed. Some question the necessity for diversification while others cast doubt 
over the viability of such an expensive undertaking3. The member states of the EU are divided on the 
importance of the Nabucco Project despite the Commission’s clear support to this undertaking. The 
consequence of this divide in the EU has meant that the project has not received sufficient backing to 
truly appear as a united EU project. EU funding for the project has also been affected by this lack of 
unity. The project also faces another kind of problem - getting sufficient gas to fill the pipeline. The 
potential suppliers in the Middle East and Central Asia are all problematic. They either have problems 
with extracting sufficient gas or they present political problems. Lastly, Russia has played its part in 
delaying the Nabucco Project and EU diversification in general. Especially Russia’s two major pipeline 
projects have helped further divide the EU4.  
The Nabucco Project has been pronounced dead by analysts numerous times over the last decade. But 
if the EU wants to diversify its gas imports Nabucco could possibly give access to vast and virtually 
untapped gas reserves from countries willing to sell. So the question begs: What makes diversification 
so important and what is the importance of Nabucco? And if the project has such potential why has its 
development stalled? This leads us to the following problem statement: 
 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
“W HE N ANA LYS ING T HE ENER G Y IN T ER DEP E NDE N CE B E TW EEN T HE EU  A N D R U SS IA I N T H E F IE L D  
OF NA TU R A L GAS ,  T WO Q U ES TI ON S AR I SE:  “W HY H AS T HE  N ABU C CO P IP E LI NE  E ME RGE D A S A  
F LAG SHIP  P RO JE C T F OR  T HE  E U COM MI SS ION AN D WH Y HA S T HE  NAB U C C O  P IP E LI NE  ST IL L NO T 
BE E N I MP LE ME N TE D? ”  
                                                             
2 The US, Russia and China have for a considerable period of time made their presence felt in the region. Each 
vying for control over the abundant hydrocarbon resources located amongst the weak and unstable states of 
Central Asia.  
3 The Nabucco Project was originally scheduled to cost around €7-8 billion  (Barysch 2010, 5) but the budget 
needed to complete the project is now estimated at a lofty €12 billion (Reuters 2011). 
4 The Nord Stream Project is a pipeline that runs from Russia through the Baltic Sea and into Germany. The South 
Stream is a scheduled project that is seen as a direct rival to Nabucco as it will deliver Central Asian and Russian 
gas into Europe using some of the same transit countries as Nabucco. Both pipelines and their impact will be 
scrutinized in section 6.4 “Russian “Divide and Rule” 
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2 THESIS FOCUS AND APPROACH 
This thesis uses a two-pronged problem statement or “research question”. The first part of the 
question deals with why the Nabucco Pipeline has been labelled a priority for the EU the EU 
Commission and various EU members. The question leads to an exploration of the interdependence 
between the EU and Russia and the geopolitical struggles created by this mutual dependence. The 
second part of the problem statement asks why the Nabucco pipeline is not further along in its 
development in 2012, a decade after its inception.  
 
2.1 THE RUSSIAN-EU ENERGY RELATIONSHIP 
Energy supply and energy security has achieved a special place in international politics and some see 
energy as the main engine for international affairs (Baev & Øverland, 2010, pp. 1077-78). The thesis 
will look at the EU’s energy relationship with Russia. Russia with its abundant gas reserves holds a 
special position in regards to the EU as there is an elaborate trade of energy products between the two. 
The relation will be further delved into in section 5 and 5.1 where especially the level of their mutual 
dependency will be analysed. 
 
2.2 NATURAL GAS AS A FOCAL POINT 
The thesis focuses specifically on natural gas. It does so for two reasons: First of all because the 
interdependence between Russia and the EU is most evident in their extensive natural gas trade. 
Secondly, because of the structural demands of gas trade; for even though the EU’s dependency on 
foreign oil is even more severe than its dependency on foreign gas (Umbach, 2010, p. 1236), the 
transportability of oil makes it much less likely to leave the EU dependent on only a few suppliers. The 
infrastructural demands of gas indicate more about the energy relationship between importer and 
exporter. Unlike oil that is easily transportable and can be shipped in barrels from one end of the 
world to another at a relatively low cost, gas is primarily delivered through pipelines. It might suggest 
why the world today is divided into three natural gas markets instead of one global market with a 
fixed price - as experienced with oil. The North American, European and Asian gas markets have highly 
diverging prices but are however not completely self-regulating markets (Deutch, 2011, pp. 86-87). 
The lack of an actual global gas price enables some suppliers like Russia to use their resource base and 
 9 Thesis focus and approach 
price-bargaining as a foreign policy tool. Consumers on the other hand often need to worry about price 
fluctuations and security of supply.    
Gas can also be liquefied and transported overseas using a technology known as LNG (Liquefied 
Natural Gas) which involves freezing the gas and thus compressing it to a transportable liquid. But the 
process comes at a high cost per cubic metre of gas and it requires special LNG plants at both the point 
of departure to condense the gas as well as at the destination point where the gas is returned to its 
natural vaporous state (Jensen Associates, 2007).  
Because of the high price of LNG gas importers and exporters prefer static pipelines when possible. 
These pipelines are however expensive to build and trading through them requires long-lasting 
bilateral agreements. Pipeline trade agreements are typically around 20 years in length and this binds 
the supplier to the importer and vice versa. The trading interdependence is thus a lot stronger in the 
field of natural gas than in other major energy sources such as oil. This makes it a more adequate field 
for analysing energy interdependence.  
 
2.3 THE NABUCCO PIPELINE AS A CASE STUDY 
In an effort to analyse the energy relationship between the two actors – Russia and the EU - this thesis 
focuses on an energy project being undertaken by several of EU’s major energy companies and 
supported by the EU Commission. This project is a 
natural gas pipeline and part of the Commission’s so-
called “Southern Corridor” strategy. The pipeline is 
planned to run through Turkey and potentially connect 
to gas supplies from states to the south of Russia. The 
Nabucco Project is relevant because it is indicative of 
the EU’s energy strategy as well as displays the 
internal struggle in the EU. Russia’s attempts to hinder 
this project is also revealing to Russia’s position as an 
energy producer as well as its complicated 
import/export relationship with EU. 
The second part of the problem statement looks at the 
troubles the Nabucco Pipeline is faced with. The 
project was first envisioned in 2002 and ten years later the first kilometre of pipe has yet to be laid 
“The Nabucco pipeline is an 
approximately 3900 kilometre long 
natural gas pipeline that is 
scheduled to run from Baumgarten 
An Der March in Austria through 
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria 
through to Ahiboz in Turkey where 
it will split in two , with one part 
going south towards Iraq and the 
other going north through 
Erzurum, Turkey to Georgia where 
it can connect to the Caucasus 
littoral states. At full capacity the 
pipeline is scheduled to transport 
31 bcm of natural gas to Europe 
(Barysch, 2010, p. 3) 
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out. The thesis will therefore examine what is keeping it from being built. This has to do with internal 
problems in the EU as well as with the actions taken by Russia to prevent the project’s execution. 
It could be perceived as too little with just one case since it is the ambition of this thesis to attempt to 
conclude something general about the energy relationship between the EU and Russia. But even 
though the Nabucco pipeline is the primary case and the focal point of the thesis’ problem statement, 
other similar projects such as Russia’s South Stream and Nord Stream projects will also be looked at. 
The two projects are perceived as competitors to Nabucco, especially the ambitious South Stream. The 
South Stream Project attempts to extract gas from some of the same supplier countries as Nabucco and 
this emphasises the fact that Russia believes Nabucco to be a threat to its energy export. In the end it 
all relates to the Nabucco Project and because these other projects are analysed in relation to Nabucco, 
the Nabucco Project can be used as the main case study. 
There are also other corporate pipeline projects which are only covered very briefly. Non-state 
projects are less telling about the energy situation than the Russian and EU projects while Nabucco5, 
South and Nord Stream are an expression of action from state actors and thus more relevant than the 
corporate equivalents. Other pipeline projects are covered in the thesis only to show the obstacles to 
Nabucco and thus help answer the second part of the problem statement.  
 
2.4 THE EU AS ONE ACTOR 
The thesis looks at the EU as a single state-like actor as well as a collection of separate nation states. 
When discussing trade between the EU and Russia, it is essentially Russia’s bilateral trade agreements 
with the individual EU member states that are being examined and not a trade with the EU as an 
institution. It is important to make this distinction between the European Union the institution and the 
collection of states united in the sphere of the European Union. 
The first part of the analysis – chapter 5 – mainly looks at the EU as one actor. This is done to illustrate 
the predicament of the collective EU. By examining the combined dependence on gas imports one can 
conclude something about the diversification needs of the entire union which are seen as the main 
argument for building Nabucco and thus answering the question: “Why has the Nabucco Pipeline 
emerged as a flagship project for the EU Commission?” 
                                                             
5 Nabucco is owned and partially funded by private corporations (30%) but is sanctioned and primarily funded 
by EU institutions and banks (70%) (Barysch, 2010, p. 5).  
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The second part of the analysis – chapter 6 – attempts to answer the question: “Why has the Nabucco 
Pipeline still not been implemented?” It does this by looking at the divisions inside the European Union 
and the conflicting needs of its member states. Here the division between the institution “the European 
Union” and its member states emerges more clearly. In chapter 6 it is an important point that the 
European Union is not one single actor and this is one of the problems the Nabucco Project is facing. 
The thesis will therefore look at some of the member states that have had a hand in influencing 
Nabucco’s fate. This is done to illustrate the division in the EU and why this has hindered the Nabucco 
Project. Section 6.2 will look at five different EU countries and their energy relationship with Russia. 
France, Germany and the UK (The “EU-3”) have been chosen because they are considered the most 
influential member states in the European Union. Their energy dependence/or lack thereof and 
general relationship with Russia is therefore deemed important to the thesis. Italy was chosen because 
they are also one of the major economies in the EU and because of their special relationship with 
Russia6. Lastly Poland was chosen as it is the largest of the new member states and often acts as a 
representative for Eastern Europe. Poland - like several other Eastern European countries - is over-
dependent on Russian gas and has expressed a strong desire to diversify away from Russia. 
 
2.5 THE NABUCCO PROJECTS’S PREVIOUS CHALLENGES 
The processes that have taken Nabucco as far as it has come since its inception in 2002 will only be 
mentioned briefly. The thesis will not spend much time examining neither the inclusion of the transit 
countries like Turkey, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania nor potential transit countries like Georgia. 
There is an interesting debate about Turkey’s position in regards to the project because of the 
symbolic as well as the politically important physical link between the west and the east. The EU and 
Turkey had tough negotiations about the conditionality of Nabucco Pipeline. These differences have 
however been resolved and this discussion has been excluded as it would not fit the direction of the 
thesis. 
Lastly, it should be noted that it is not the ambition of this thesis to judge whether or not the Nabucco 
Project is feasible as a business proposition. The aim is to sum up the factors that have led the Nabucco 
Project to becoming a point of emphasis for the Commission and the factors that are hindering it from 
becoming reality. 
                                                             
6 Italy’s major energy company ENI is Gazprom’s partner in the ambitious South Stream Project which will be 
covered in subsection 6.4.3 
 12 Thesis focus and approach 
2.6 INTRODUCING THE EMPIRICAL DATA IN THE ANALYSIS  
The empirical data of the thesis is implemented directly into the analysis chapters and not presented 
separately as is otherwise the custom. There is very little relevant primary data to be gathered on the 
topic apart from statistical data about the production, consumption and trade of natural gas and other 
energy resources and it was unnecessary to present this data in a separate chapter. Instead the data is 
presented when used in the analysis and is spread out over chapters 5 and 6. The absence of a 
separate empirical section is aimed at giving the thesis a more natural flow and makes it shorter and 
easier to read.  
 
2.7 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS’ ANALYSIS 
A diagram showing the layout of the thesis is displayed below. The analysis is divided into two 
chapters – chapters 5 and 6 – to meet the two-part nature of the problem statement.  
The first chapter, chapter 5 “Analysis of the interdependence between the EU and Russia”, will mainly 
deal with the first part of the problem statement: “Why has the Nabucco Pipeline emerged as a flagship 
project for the EU commission?”  
Chapter 6, “An analysis of what is keeping Nabucco from being built”, will deal primarily with the 
second part of the problem statement which reads: “Why has the Nabucco Pipeline still not been 
implemented?”  
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Chapter 5 starts by examining the interdependence between the EU and Russia in the field of natural 
gas. It will be established that it exists and then look at what it means in particular for the European 
Union.  
It will be looked at why the EU’s dependence on Russia could be a problem to the EU and whether this 
dependence could potentially be increasing. Section 5.1 will examine why the EU’s dependency on 
Russian natural gas imports could pose a problem for Europe, especially if the consumption in the EU 
rises.  
Section 5.2 will look at how the Nabucco project could change interdependence status quo between 
the EU and Russia. It will be argued that the Nabucco pipeline could lessen the EU’s dependency by 
diversifying their import sources. 
Chapter 6 will attempt to answer the question posed in the second part of the problem statement. 
After concluding that the Nabucco pipeline could aid the EU by diversifying its gas supply the thesis 
will look at what is stalling the project. This is done by first examining the problem that Nabucco poses 
to Russia. The aim of this is to explain Russia’s actions and why they are so aggressively trying to keep 
Nabucco from being built. This is followed by a section on the problems the EU has faced with securing 
sufficient gas supply to the Nabucco Pipeline. The section examines the attempts to secure supply 
sources for Nabucco. Section 6.3 will then scrutinize the internal dispute that the Nabucco Project has 
caused in the EU over whether or not there is a need to diversify the Union’s gas supplies. It will then 
P R OBLE M S TA TE ME N T:   
“W HY HAS T HE NA BU C CO  P IP EL IN E E MER G ED AS A  FLAG S HIP  P R O JE CT  FO R  TH E EU  
COM M IS SI ON  A ND WHY H AS T H E NABU CC O P IP E LI NE  S T IL L NO T B EE N I MP LE MEN T ED?”  
 
 
CHAP TER 6:  A NAL Y S IS P ART 2  
“An analysis of what is keeping Nabucco from being 
built”. 
CHAP TER 5:  A NAL Y S IS P ART 1  
“Analysis of the interdependence between the EU 
and Russia”. 
 
 CON CLU SI ON  
 
IN TR ODU CT IO N AND P R O BLE M F IE LD  
 
 
Why has the Nabucco Pipeline emerged as a 
flagship project for the EU commission? 
Why has the Nabucco Pipeline still not been 
implemented? 
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be argued that the EU is split between the supporters and detractors of Nabucco with the detractors 
being some of the major powers in the EU such as Germany, France and Italy while the supporters are 
mainly the UK and eastern European countries such as Poland.  
Following up on the previous section it will be argued that Russia has attempted to increase the divide 
in the EU by courting some of the major powers in the EU, by buying up energy infrastructure in the 
EU and by planning competing projects. 
Lastly the thesis will look at some of the international developments in the natural gas market that 
may have hurt the Nabucco pipeline’s chances of being completed as the need for pipeline gas has been 
lessened by an excess supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG) coming in from the Middle East. The 
section will also look at the developments in shale gas and lastly Nabucco West and TANAP pipelines 
which may end up as the alternatives to the original Nabucco pipeline.  
 
3 EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This chapter will look at some of the project’s empirical considerations. The project mostly uses 
scientific articles and books as instruments to the analysis and as a general source of information. 
Some web sites and newspaper articles have been used to collect facts about certain events. Their 
analyses of these events have not been used as it has not been deemed reliable enough and only facts 
from the more well-known and trusted news sources have been used. This especially concerns the 
more recent events of 2012 where there are no relevant scientific articles to base analysis on.  
 
3.1 USE OF “BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY”  
The report “BP Statistical Review of World Energy” (BP, 2012) is used extensively in this thesis. It is a 
report made by the British energy company British Petroleum (BP) that examines the annual 
production and consumption of energy. The report is used as a support for many of the claims in the 
analysis regarding the interdependence between Russia and the EU. It is regarded as one of the more 
reliable energy reports in the world and the thesis therefore uses the report as the main source of data 
to give the most reliable and comparable data. Though both BP and the participating countries could 
have incentives to send out inaccurate information about their energy supply and/or energy usage, 
BP’s report has been published for 60 years and is highly respected for its accuracy.  
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The analysis mainly uses the more recent 2012 report published in June 2012, but in a few places the 
2011 report has also been used as its data on gas imports from Russia to the EU-27 is more specific 
regarding trade from The Russian Federation to Europe. The 2012 report groups several countries 
together into “Other Europe” which makes it hard to decipher the precise imports to the EU. So even 
though it could be said to slightly compromise comparability the thesis will use a combination of the 
two reports to give the most precise yet up-to-date data.  
 
3.2 INTERVIEW 
An interview with Kurt Bligaard Pedersen was conducted in the process of researching for this thesis  
(Bligaard Pedersen, 2011). The respondent - Kurt Bligaard Pedersen - is one of the executive vice 
presidents of the Danish energy company DONG. The interview was conducted in the earlier stages of 
the project using a semi-structured interview form. This type of interview was used to gain base 
knowledge of natural gas as a product in the energy market and of the EU’s position as an energy 
consumer. The respondent’s position is considered to give him a unique insight into the field and his 
answers are therefore considered useful and valid as a basis for further research.  
The semi-structured interview form requires that a series of themes are covered through the 
interview. The interview was structured with few, short questions. The intention of using few opening 
questions such as these was to allow for spontaneous exhaustive answers where the respondent to a 
large extent dictates the direction of the interview (Kvale, 1997, pp. 136-137). This also meant that 
several topics were covered by the respondent before the prepared questions on the topic were even 
asked. This allowed for a more natural flow of the conversation and allowed the interview to cover a 
wider range of topics within the designated time frame of 90 minutes.  
The thesis does not directly quote Mr. Bligaard Pedersen but the knowledge gained in this interview 
was invaluable to the process and it permeates through the project. The weakness of the qualitative 
interview is of course the potential for the subjective view of the respondent to influence the answers. 
The risk of this is however minimized as the interview is not used as a direct source in the thesis 
(Kvale, 1997, p. 231). The object of having a semi-structured interview early on was to get an expert’s 
understanding in the field of energy. This helped the further research greatly as the authors of this 
thesis had very little prior knowledge of the energy markets and the position of natural gas in the field 
of energy.  
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4 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The theories for this thesis have been chosen with the aim of understanding the environment that the 
Nabucco Project is part off and exposed to. This environment is understood as an almost equal mixture 
of competitiveness and close cooperation between the EU and Russia. The interdependence between 
the actors is evident and per definition crucial for either side’s future socio-economic success. Be it due 
to security of supply or security of demand. Therefore when discussing that blatant rivalry over gas 
suppliers occurs it takes place in a context where continued cooperation is paramount to both actors.  
A combination of both Complex Liberal Interdependence Theory and International Society Theory7 
will be applied in this thesis. These theories will provide basic understanding of the interaction 
between the EU and Russia as well as internally in the EU. They will also assist in understanding the 
link between conflictual occurrences and cooperative commitment simultaneously by the same actors. 
Both of these traditional IR theories will be applied as they combined strengthen the ability to 
comprehend the motives and actions taken by the actors and thus provide a better analysis.  
 
4.1 COMPLEX LIBERAL INTERDEPENDENCE 
This particular theory has its roots in western societies and at first glance may not be the obvious 
choice. But the distinctive situation - that is the present EU-Russia energy relationship - requires some 
reflection beyond the classical notion that the EU is simply dependent on Russian energy products. 
Furthermore this theory will be used in conjunction with International Society Theory to illustrate the 
level of cooperation amongst the EU member states. 
Firstly, it is true that Russian gas accounts for around one quarter of the total consumption in the EU 
and for some member states the dependency accounts for 100% of consumption. But that said Russia 
provides less than 10% of the EU’s combined energy needs. Secondly, the EU is by far Russia’s largest 
market and Russia’s national energy companies such as Gazprom are highly dependent on the 
continuation of its lucrative dealings in Europe. So in short Russia needs the EU at least as much as the 
EU needs Russia (Cameron, 2010, p. 20).  
“In an earlier age the possession of territory and ample natural resources were the key to greatness. In 
today’s world that is no longer the case; now a highly qualified labour force, access to information and 
financial capital are the keys to success.” (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, pp. 103-4). It will be argued in the 
                                                             
7 Occasionally referred to as Liberal-Realism or more commonly known as the English School. 
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in chapter 5 and 6 that the EU has achieved a high level of modernization but that Russia is somewhat 
stuck in its transition. Russia is a modern state yet natural resources are given the highest national 
priority. That hampers the level and scope of interdependence between the EU and Russia (Jackson & 
Sørensen, 2007, p. 107). 
 
The complex interdependence between states implies a more cooperative and friendly relationship 
(Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 106). The EU’s various institutions keep the members linked in 
continuous talks about expanding the supranational agenda to further unite its members. But when 
examined on a national level the interdependence with Russia varies greatly from member state to 
member state. Still, the overall EU-Russia interdependence is evident and will be the primary focus of 
this thesis.  
As prescribed by the theory ‘power resources’ are of a non-military character and are of increasing 
importance. It will rest on such things as negotiating skills. Furthermore these will often be tied to 
specific issue areas (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, pp. 106-7). In the case of the EU as a whole its stability 
as a business partner and importer of energy products in particular are exemplary. But perhaps most 
characteristic is its preference for legal regimes of a multilateral character as the Nabucco Project and 
the EU acquis8 so exemplify (Barysch, 2010, p. 9). The EU will thus command influence in the shaping 
and maintenance of international legal regimes. In Russia’s case they will command influence on 
international gas distribution because of their monopoly on westbound gas and massive pipeline 
infrastructure. Any given influence held in one area is however hard to convert into other issue areas 
(Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, pp. 106-7). That is nevertheless exactly what the EU Commission and also 
                                                             
8 “EU acquis” is a term for the combined legal acts and court decisions of the EU. In this case the acquis states that 
owners of a gas pipeline are required to sell access to the pipeline on terms dictated by the open market. It is 
aimed at avoiding monopolistic suppliers.  
Types of international relations (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 106) 
Realism Complex interdependence 
States dominant actors and coherent units Transnational actors increasingly important 
States coherent units 
Force usable and effective Military force less useful. Economic and 
institutional instruments more useful 
Military security dominates the agenda Military security less important. Welfare issues 
increasingly important 
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several member states are concerned with: that Russia can transform its position as main supplier of 
energy products to the EU into political leverage. The chosen theories will assist in determining 
whether the Russian state have shown a desire to do so when able to or rather has been forced into 
such actions by current circumstances.  
The Complex Interdependence Theory is also classified as being ‘weak liberalist’ as it acknowledges 
many of the fundamental beliefs of Realism Theory. The theory will emphasize the possibilities offered 
to all involved by the mutual dependence but it is a necessity that the actors share common interests 
such as gas export/import. If that is the case institutions will be able to strengthen the relationship and 
offer incentives to all involved. Common interests and institutions thus remove the notion of relative 
gains. Common interests are thus the basis for explaining cooperative involvement in an anarchic 
world (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 118).  
 
4.2 INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY THEORY 
The International Society tradition can be considered to fill up the space between Classical Realism 
and Classical Liberalism and making that place into a separate but still traditional International 
Relations approach.  
It recognizes a setting where international anarchy prevails and “machtpolitik” is present. The theory 
perceives the world as an anarchical society which implies that certain common rules and institutions 
are in place that statespeople make use of to conduct their foreign policy (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 
129). States are sovereign, independent and self-interested but rules also matter and influence state 
actions. Therefore establishing legal regimes for a multitude of purposes or refraining to join them has 
an impact. The negotiations on the new Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) between 
Russia and the EU are an excellent example: Russia criticizes the EU’s proposed rigid rules whereas the 
EU has reservations with the present agreement as it is too flexible and not transparent enough. 
International Society Theory, unlike Realism Theory emphasizes that there is a hesitance and caution 
to join treaty commitments as these are considered binding by statespeople. 
The International Society Theory refers to the fact that states in themselves are not active. It is the 
statespeople who operate them and take the actions ultimately leading to state action internationally. 
In accordance with this when the term state is used in the thesis it is with acknowledgement of this 
human interaction between the states (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 130). As that is the case it must be 
considered plausible that individuals can have had an impact on the Nabucco Project. 
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FIGURE 4-1 THE NATION STATE'S POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY THEORY 
 
The theory emphasizes the importance of a holistic approach where the parts alone cannot be fully 
understood unless the whole is viewed at and understood (See Figure 4-1). 
The ‘system of states’-concept is broadly comparable with realism and neorealism as it revolves 
around power politics amongst states. It places the process and structure of international anarchy at 
the centre of IR theory with no “world government” above sovereign states (Buzan, 2004, p. 7). Hedley 
Bull made a stark distinction between a ‘system of states’ and a ‘society of states’. An international 
system or ‘system of states’ is developed when two or more states interact regularly and thus reach an 
influence level where one state has impact on another’s decisions. Calculations of other states’ 
behaviour therefore become a necessity (Bull, Hedley. 1995, p. 9-14).  
Russia has become heavily involved with western institutions after the end of the Cold War and has 
obtained a close relationship with the EU.(Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 133). Russia has approached 
and is closely involved with the West but despite a somewhat optimistic Western European sentiment 
it clearly has not become part of the West (Barysch 2, 2010, pp. 3-4).  
Realist elements of the International Society Theory will be helpful in exemplifying the national 
interests between the EU-27 causing divide in the EU in general and in regards to the Nabucco Project 
in particular.  
State 
Actor 
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The ‘society of states’ is the central concept of the theory and focuses on an institutionalisation of 
shared identity, interests, norms and values as is the case of the EU. A ‘society of states’ is - unlike the 
‘system of states’ - not simply based on the behavioural calculation of other states whilst also 
cooperating. A ‘society’ of particular independent states is created via shared norms and values 
obtained through dialogue and a common understanding of rules. These states manifest themselves 
through installed institutions which are maintained by joint interests so they can purposefully enable 
the involved actors to conduct their relations (Buzan, 2004, p. 9). An international society is a ‘norm-
governed’ relationship where its members acknowledge that they at least have limited responsibilities 
towards the other states as well as the society as a whole (Brown, 2009, s. 48-53). States follow their 
interests but not at any cost. The analysis of the perceived relevance for the Nabucco and South Stream 
projects respectively will take that into account. But also with the notion that laws that are the basis 
among one group of states such as the EU can not necessarily be applied outside of that ‘society of 
states’. When the term EU is used in the thesis it is understood as a successful regional phenomenon 
consisting of highly industrialised interdependent modern nations with a shared rule set built on 
common norms, values and institutions. 
The ‘world society’-idea is based on an understanding that highlights the importance of human beings 
and downplays the relevance of the state. In other words it talks about a ‘community of humankind’ as 
more fundamental than the the concept of the ‘state’ (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 133). Barry Buzan 
argues that as long as day-to-day world politics is dominated by the pillars of ‘system of states’ and 
‘society of states’ this theory could cope with the third pillar being more of a utopian concept of the 
theory. He further argues that if one believes this will change and that the world society concept is 
rising in significance it should be rectified in the theory (Buzan, 2004, p. 11). This thesis will operate 
with the concept that states are and will continue to be the fundamental element in human conduct on 
the international stage.  
Martin Wight believes that the three traditions of the major schools of Realism, Rationalism and 
Revolutionism are all needed to obtain a proper understanding of international relations. Realism is 
used to explain the conflictual nature of interstate relations, rationalism is used to explain the role of 
the rule of law, trade and cooperation and revolutionism defines the role of ideas and includes the 
influence of individuals as relevant actors (Wight, 1991, pp. 7-8). 
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Four dimensions of responsibility (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 146) 
 Responsible to whom? Responsible for what? 
National Our citizens National security 
International Other states International peace 
 
According to Barry Buzan the international society scholar Robert Jackson “...puts an interesting twist 
on the three traditions by viewing them as defining the diverse values that states people have to juggle in 
the conduct of foreign policy. Realism he sees as giving priority to national responsibilities, rationalism he 
sees as giving priority to international responsibilities, and revolutionism .... he sees as giving priority to 
humanitarian responsibilities...” (Buzan, 2004, p. 8). Responsibility - whilst performing statecraft is 
possibly an everyday occurrence but it can have a visible impact on international politics depending 
on the moral choices of statespeople (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, pp. 147-47). 
Two of the most fundamental values in International Society Theory are the concepts of ‘International 
Order’ and ‘International Justice’. In reference to order it implies actions taken that sustain the basic 
goals of the society of states. In reference to justice it is the moral rules of states that are the subject. 
The rights and duties of states include the right of non-intervention, the right of self-determination 
and the right of equality amongst sovereign states9 (Bull, 1995, s. 78-79). The theory has two main 
wings namely pluralists and solidarists which each ultimately disagree on what should take 
precedence: ‘Sovereignty of states’ or ‘human rights’ (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, pp. 133-34).  
 
4.3 HOW THE THEORIES COMPLIMENT EACH OTHER 
Both theories acknowledge that states are the primary actors in international politics and both 
theories also recognize that ‘other actors’ can be influential as well. These ‘other actors’ also include 
private energy companies but the theories stress that these - despite having influence - are dependent 
on the state in one form or another.  
There is little emphasis on economics in International Society Theory as its focus rests mainly on 
international politics and tends to ignore international economics. Bull does mention ‘regional 
economic associations’ (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 155) and Wight also notes that commerce is one 
                                                             
9 The principle of the legal equality of states had been affirmed by a treatise in 1758 which provided the formal 
basis for the development of the system (The Expansion of International Society, Hedley Bull & Adam Watson, 
1985, p. 357).    
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of the basic relations between sovereign states (Wight, 1991, p. 1). The lack of economic focus should 
not be an issue since this thesis aims at exploring the results of political friction and/or cooperation 
between the member states of the EU as well as between the EU and Russia. But as natural gas can be 
of political value as well as of commercial value the Complex Interdependence Theory will highlight 
the economic interest of the cooperation between the EU and Russia. 
The theory of Complex Interdependence perceives the EU-Russian cooperation as a mutually 
beneficial situation. However it will be argued that one actor will always strive to be less dependent on 
the other. As previously explained trade in general and gas trade in particular – with its expensive 
static pipelines and long-term contracts -   have created interdependence between the European Union 
member states and the Russian Federation. Complex Interdependence Theory is suitable to explain 
this very situation although it is normally used to explain interdependence between more integrated 
actors as found in Western societies. The International Society Theory assists in understanding the EU-
Russian relationship as it is not without its predicaments. Energy security can be considered linked to 
traditional security concerns and thus focused on how and why the EU acts upon possible threats to 
the security of their gas supply (Umbach, 2010, p. 1230). That includes diversification in general but 
especially in relation to Russia. 
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5 ANALYSIS OF THE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN THE EU AND 
RUSSIA 
This chapter attempts to answer the first part of the problem statement: “Why has the Nabucco 
Pipeline emerged as a flagship project for the EU Commission?” In this chapter it will be established that 
there is a interdependence between the EU and Russia and it will be analysed why this might have 
created a severely problematic situation for the EU. In section 5.2 the value of the Nabucco pipeline 
from the perspective of the EU will be discussed. The following section will specifically underline the 
interconnectedness of the EU and Russia and emphasize its interaction and trade - mainly in fossil 
fuels.  
A strong bond exists between the EU and Russia.  Even though the two actors seem to disagree on a 
number of issues in regards to foreign as well as domestic policy they are still heavily linked to each 
other.  The EU exported goods for over €86 billion and imported for €158.6 billion with Russia in 2010 
- most of which are energy products (European Commission, 2012). Substantial trade interest between 
the two actors binds them together - Especially when it comes to their hydrocarbon trade. 
The EU consumes around 450 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas per year and only about 35% 
of it is produced in the EU-27 (BP, 2012, pp. 22-23). Due to this lack of sufficient domestic resources 
the EU has to rely on imports to cover most of its gas consumption. Russia has one of the world’s 
largest reserves of fossil 
fuels and this coincides with 
an EU need as the European 
Union is one of the world’s 
largest energy consumers. 
Russia’s strength as an 
energy exporter is especially 
evident in the field of natural 
gas. Russia has a vast reserve 
of 44800 bcm of natural gas 
lodged beneath its surface. 
That amounts to almost a 
quarter of the Earth’s proven 
reserves and are by far the largest reserves of any country. The EU member states imported 117 bcm 
FIGURE 5-1 SOURCES OF THE EU'S GAS CONSUMPTION (BP, 2012, PP. 22-
23;28-29) 
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from Russia in 2011 (BP, 2012, p. 29) covering 26% of the EU’s total gas consumption that year (BP, 
2012, p. 23;29). In other words the EU relies on Russian imports to cover nearly a quarter of its total 
gas needs. The EU’s natural gas reserves are running out10 and even though shale gas deposits in 
Europe might alter that image11 the main problem is that consumption is expected to climb in the near 
future.  
Projecting the EU’s demand for natural gas in the near future is very difficult. Projections from 2007 by 
Eurogas estimated that demand would rise with as much as 40% in the next 20 years (Eurogas, 2007, 
pp. 2-3) increasing the need for further imports and possibly alternative sources of supply. Those 
estimations have since been undermined by the financial crisis of 2008 which diluted even the most 
reliable projections on gas consumption in Europe (Baev & Øverland, 2010, p. 1079). In 2011 the EU 
demand for natural gas declined by over 10% which is by far the largest drop in several decades 
(Eurostat, 2012) (BP, 2012, p. 22). This has stumped experts and made estimates for the future very 
uncertain. 
Further clouding the issue is the EU’s 
issuance of the so-called “20-20-20”-
plan12 which was announced in 2007 
and which aims to reduce the CO2-
emissions of the EU  (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2008). The 
ambitions of this plan make EU’s natural 
gas demand extremely hard to predict; 
for even though gas is a pollutant and 
thus contributes to the global 
environmental problems, it is also the 
cleanest of the fossil fuels (see Figure 5-2). The financial crisis has also slowed investments in all types 
of energy infrastructure and energy efficiency measures. This especially hurts green energy advances 
and makes fossil fuels an easier option (Umbach, 2010, p. 1234).  So even if the EU manages to reduce 
its CO2-output by 20%, the “20-20-20”-plan will most likely increase the demand for gas even further 
(Baev & Øverland, 2010, pp. 1080-81). An increase in EU consumption will consequently increase 
imports as the EU is unable to increase production significantly. Norway’s gas reserves will deplete in 
                                                             
10 At the current consumption the EU is expected to deplete its natural gas reserves by 2024 (BP, 2012, p. 20) 
11 As will be discussed in section 6.5.2 
12 The “20-20-20”-plan is part of the EU Commission’s Climate and Energy Plan. It aims to reduce the EU’s CO2-
emissions 20% below the 1990 level, increase the EU’s renewable energy consumption by 20% and increase 
energy efficiency by 20% (EU Commission, 2010). 
FIGURE 5-2 CO2-EMISSIONS PER BTU AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF COAL (NATURAL GAS SUPPLY ASSOCIATION, 2011) 
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20 years and will most likely maintain its present production capacity till then (BP, 2012, p. 20). 
Algeria embraced a free market economy in 1994 and saw a massive boom in gas production but has 
since 1999 remained roughly at the same output level despite findings of new deposits (US Energy 
Information Administration, 2012). This means that more Russian gas is likely a certainty in the 
coming years. 
For Russia the trade with the EU is crucial. The Russian Federation relies on its massive natural gas 
reserves as a steady source of revenue for the country. Russia is the world’s leading exporter of 
natural gas with all exports going through the state-owned company Gazprom13 . According to 
Gazprom’s own website the company generated 119.3 billion euros worth of revenue in 2011 alone14 
(Gazprom 2, 2012). Gazprom - which essentially means Russia - has the EU as its biggest client by far. 
Some member states clearly stand out though, such as Germany and Italy. Russia’s total exports in 
2011 amounted to around 221 bcm with 117 bcm of those going to the EU (BP, 2012, pp. 28-29). 
The mutual dependence also goes beyond energy trade. The EU-27 is by far Russia’s largest trading 
partner both in regards to import and export accounting for roughly 47% of its overall trade turnover 
in 2010. The EU is also by far the most important investor of Foreign Direct Investment15 (FDI) in 
Russia accounting for an estimated 75% of FDI (European Commission, 2012). Russia is the EU’s third-
largest trading partner imports to the EU consist almost exclusively of certain types of goods such as: 
hydrocarbon fuel sources, minerals and chemical products. This makes up the majority of the Russian 
export to the EU, and Russian FDI in the EU follows the same pattern as it is kept mainly to energy 
related infrastructure. When reversed the picture looks entirely different. The EU is Russia’s largest 
trading partner and the imported goods from the EU cover almost every facet of Russian society. The 
FDI from EU companies reflects this as well and is spread over all sectors of the Russian economy. The 
EU member states seem to be the largest foreign investors in almost every niche of Russian economy 
(de Souza, 2008, pp. 3-5). The trade between the EU and Russia is extensive and seems mutually 
beneficial. But mutual reliance is not without its problems. 
  
 
                                                             
13 The Russian Government owns 50,002% of the company – a controlling share. (Gazprom, 2012) 
14 Compared with revenues from Gazprom in 2003 which amounted to less than 23 billion euro (Lucas, 2008, pp. 
66-67)   
 
15 FDI is one company’s investment into production in a company located in another country. 
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5.1 WHY THE MUTUAL RELIANCE BETWEEN THE EU AND RUSSIA COULD BE 
PROBLEMATIC FOR EUROPE 
It has been established that the EU and Russia are extremely dependent on each other. Using 
International Society theory in addition to the Complex Interdependence theory it will be analysed 
whether this poses a problem for the EU. This section of the thesis will delve into the differences in 
values, norms, and institutions of the EU compared with those of Russia. It will also highlight the 
foreign policy disagreements, the EU’s Eastern European members’ over-dependence on Russian gas 
the EU’s projected increased gas consumption, the stability of Russia as a gas supplier, and the 
differing opinions on international law. The sum of these events and viewpoints emphasises why the 
Nabucco Pipeline has been deemed necessary by a number of EU policy makers. 
Using Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s view on Complex Liberal Interdependence Theory it can be 
established that the interdependence between Russia and the EU certainly benefits both actors. Firstly 
the EU gains gas and oil that can be converted to much-needed energy for the residents and the 
industry of the 27 member states. Russia on the other hand gains an income that is now vital to its 
economy (Shleifer & Treisman, 2011, p. 126). Secondly, using this view it can be established that this 
interdependence helps keep the peace between Russia and the EU. In accordance with the theory the 
two actors are now too dependent on one another for any military conflict to be likely to arise; the 
cooperation is simply too valuable (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, pp. 106-107). There are of course other 
factors keeping the two from military conflict – most notably is NATO a deterrent which most of the 
EU member states are also a part of. Still, the theory emphasizes interdependence as the primary 
factor since a breakdown of the relationship would result in severe socio-economic consequences for 
both the EU and the Russian Federation. 
Unlike realists, interdependence liberals do not believe that any issue can become vital enough to start 
a conflict, but they do believe that: “It is not impossible to imagine dramatic conflict or revolutionary 
change in which the use of threat over an economic issue or among advanced industrial countries might 
become plausible” (Keohane, 1977, p. 28). If something is valuable enough to the state or actor, conflict 
can still emerge. Since energy is a crucial resource and since natural gas is seen as an “essential 
component of the energy supply” for the EU (Regulation No.994/2010, 1.) there is an inherent risk for 
both actors in the increasing interdependence the energy trade has created. The import from Russia 
consists mainly of fossil fuels which no longer can be looked upon as merely economic goods. The 
strategic importance of energy means that the state to a higher degree is involved in securing and 
maintaining a stable supply of this resource. Interdependence therefore only applies as long as the two 
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actors are equally dependent on each other. But that balance may change in favour of one actor over 
the other.  
The essence of the concept “interdependence” is directly linked to the role of power in politics as well 
as to the relations between actors on the international stage (Keohane, 1977, pp. 122-132). So an 
unfavourable shift in the balance of dependence is therefore naturally a concern to both sides and is 
illustrated clearly by the Nabucco Project as well as by the actions taken by Russia to counter 
Nabucco16.  
Russia wants to matter in the 21st century as well as it did in the 20th century. This is not only due to 
nostalgia for an empire lost but also due to great power ambitions matching their present capabilities. 
In the 2000’s a resurgent Russia re-entered the international stage and Putin’s Munich speech in 2007 
cemented it verbally17  as the Russo-Georgian conflict in 2008 cemented it physically. Albeit one must 
consider the decline in the effectiveness of military power at least in regards to the EU combined with 
a technologically ageing, poorly maintained and costly conventional Russian army (Buzan & Wæver, 
2003, p. 434). The military remains a foreign policy tool for Moscow nonetheless and will continue to 
do so but it has limited applicability in its relationship with the West and this is where currency and 
pipelines could achieve better results with less chance of blowback (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 103). 
Considering the nature of interdependence as well as the EU’s success on a wide range of areas 
Russia’s only true leverage lies in its position as supplier of highly sought after energy products. That 
leverage, however possibly overestimated, will be the focus of the Russian foreign policy for the 
foreseeable future as a means of external as well as domestic success - as described in its 2030 energy 
strategy plan (Russian Federation, 2010, p. 3 & 14). Putin once stated that energy “to a large extent 
determines the country’s place in geopolitics” (Cameron, 2010, p. 23) and the national agenda of 
vigorously pursuing energy as a political state asset is characteristic of the Putin period.  
The Russian Federation inherited the bulk of the old Soviet Union pipeline infrastructure - the largest 
in the world (Barysch 2, 2010, p. 4) - which was designed to link its satellite states to Moscow. This 
translates into a massive Russian pipeline presence in Eastern Europe as well as in the Commonwealth 
of Independent States18 (CIS) today.  Diversification away from this former centralistic design has only 
recently been acted upon by the newest members in the EU. This is in glaring contrast to the central 
and western EU member states that have diversification firmly included in their energy security 
portfolio. The interdependence between the two actors to a large degree negates eventual use of 
                                                             
16 Russia’s actions to counter Nabucco are a focal point of chapter 6. 
17 In 2007 President Putin held a speech in Munich where he accused the US of “overstepping its borders” and 
heavily criticized the ”uni-polar world” order the US was leading (Watson, 2007) 
18 CIS is an organization of consisting of countries from the former USSR 
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leverage as the EU and Russia are “equally” invested in this endeavour. But applying international 
society theory it cannot be ignored that the EU is comprised of 27 sovereign member states with 
highly divergent foreign policies and views on Russia. That said the special bond that resides amongst 
mostly like-minded politicians in the EU is not to be overlooked and will be explored further when 
discussing the relevance of the EU as a ‘society of states’ in the following section.  
So the real problem with this mutual reliance is the fact that Russia not only wants to continue to 
export to Europe on a long-term basis but that they cannot allow the EU to diversify its import sources. 
This is not to suggest that the EU is powerless in this matter as it is potentially one of the most 
influential actors on the globe. The argument is that Russia will do literally everything possible to 
make its strategy succeed now and onwards. Russia’s concern is therefore not EU energy security but 
preserving its own dominant position in Europe as well as in Central Asia. It implies that Russia is 
opting for a “gas containment” of Europe (Erdogdu, 2010, p. 18 & 28). In 2008 the English Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown warned that the EU was in danger of placing itself in an “energy stranglehold” 
by states such as Russia (Shleifer & Treisman, 2011, pp. 125-127).This is perhaps an exaggeration 
considering that much of the EU is well-diversified (Barysch, 2010, p. 6). But it can certainly be argued 
that a clear signal has been sent to the EU via actions taken on the international stage that Nabucco or 
other similar projects are considered non grata by Moscow. 
Any sizable reliance on just one state is of course problematic for the EU, and the reliance on Russia is 
especially troublesome. The following will scrutinize some of the reasons why this is the case. 
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5.1.1 A ‘SOCIETY OF STATES’ AMONGST THE EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES 
It will be illustrated in this subsection - in accordance with the International Society Theory - that 
there exists a ‘society of states’ between the EU member states and that their international relations 
with other members take place in accordance with the common rules of this community . 
Subsequently EU-Russian relations are conducted as part of a ‘system of states’ where certain common 
rules do apply but where the internal rules and norms of the EU holds little sway.  
“THE ‘SYSTEM OF STATES’ IS A REALIST CONCEPT; THE ‘SOCIETY OF 
STATES’ IS A LIBERAL CONCEPT. THE MORE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
CONSTITUTE A SOCIETY AND THE LESS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
MERELY COMPOSE A SYSTEM IS AN INDICATION OF THE EXTENT TO 
WHICH WORLD POLITICS FORMS A DISTINCTIVE HUMAN CIVILIZATION 
WITH ITS OWN NORMS AND VALUES” 
 (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 132). 
The EU members over time have developed a specific set of enduring procedures, norms, rules, laws 
and values that also have an impact on the perception of national interests (Morgan, 2000, p. 574). 
Despite the member states yielding some sovereignty to the EU institution, this is not to be mistaken 
for an actual degradation of the state. So despite the massive development and connectedness 
amongst people and statespeople in Europe, the state is still a central feature of the EU and will 
continue to be so. Since the anarchical society is a reality the management between related states to 
cope with one another when disagreeing determines the solidity of a ‘society of states’ and as such its 
foundation.  
“(…) TODAY’S EU (…) IS A SOCIETY IN WHICH THE MEMBER STATES ARE 
BOUND FAIRLY SOLIDLY TOGETHER BY THE NETWORK OF COMMON 
RULES AND INSTITUTIONS WHICH THEY HAVE VOLUNTARILY CREATED 
AND SUSTAINED: A SOCIETY IN WHICH CONFLICTS BETWEEN MEMBER 
STATES, ALTHOUGH CERTAINLY STILL ENDEMIC, ARE RESOLVED, OR 
MANAGED, BY PEACEFUL PROCEDURES INSTEAD OF (…) VIOLENCE” 
 (Morgan, 2000, p. 574). 
Even though economic interdependence is of otherwise major importance the EU is more than just a 
material alliance. The EU members as a whole can lessen their focus on calculating the motives of the 
27 elements in this ‘society’. It could be argued that one member might rationally choose to 
misinterpret a rule and apply it to its own advantage.  However, states in a ‘society of states’ share a 
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likeminded, fundamental understanding of rules. In short one would not break the common rules as 
they per definition also are one’s own rules (or norms). 
In other words it is the common norms and values of the entire ’society of states’ that are of relevance. 
These are expressed by the various institutions within the EU that help bring the member states 
together. So in the case of the EU the set of agreeable rules and values are of another character than 
between the EU and Russia and disputes are settled by words and not through the use of economic or 
military force.  Therefore when discussing whether a group of states is more inclined to cooperate or 
able to see eye-to-eye on politics beyond national self-interest, naturally there must also be states not 
sharing these attributes.  
Compared with EU politicians the Russian ruling elite uses an authoritarian and distorted version of 
capitalism. The open economic system in Europe is rightly alarmed by the Russian state’s 
nationalization of private energy companies as well as by the investments made by the state-run 
‘wealth funds’ from Russia that are aided by money acquired from illegally bankrupted companies 
such as Yukos Oil Company19. The funds obtained from state critical companies are used to buy more 
influence for the Russian state abroad (Lucas, 2008, p. 271). Russia maintains its companies are 
normal economic actors but occasionally claims national interest when it cuts off energy deliveries to 
for example Latvia and Lithuania because of political debacles (Lucas, 2008, pp. 271-272). From a 
Russian point of view this is rational but from an EU perspective it is intolerable. Russia’s use of law is 
seemingly a ‘rule by law’ which is in contrast to the EU’s ‘rule of law’20. Moscow also perceives the idea 
of the ‘free market’ differently from the EU as Russia doesn’t believe that monopoly is in contradiction 
with the core principles of that notion. As such agreeing to the same rules is not the same as 
understanding or using them in similar way. 
Another contrast is that whilst the EU tries to ensure its high legitimacy it tries to a large extent to 
make those of similar beliefs join it as equal members whereas Russia dominates its surrounding by 
more heavy-handed measures applying all political tools in its effort to pursue its imperial order 
(Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 434-37). Energy export is seen as the tool to the desired Russian ascent 
covering roughly 1/3 of the state budget. So the prospect of EU diversification is not perceived by 
Russia as ordinary caution but as a severe threat. As the Kremlin notes, power in today’s world rests 
on economic might (Shleifer & Treisman, 2011, pp. 125-129). What can be interpreted as Mr Putin’s 
                                                             
19 Yukos Oil Company was a Russian energy company that was declared bankrupt and its owner thrown in prison 
for fraud. Both under very suspect allegations in a case that has since been declared in violation of human right 
by the European Court of Human Rights (Associated Press, 2011) 
20 The difference being that the law is an instrument of the state to control the people rather than an instrument 
of the people with which to be protected from the state.  
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economics dissertation from the 1990’s made that message clear as it was underscored that the 
natural resources of Russia were too important to be handled by private companies and only through 
the state could it be realised (Lucas, 2008, p. 211). His aspirations speak for themselves as Russia has 
since emerged as a petrostate and the withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) in 2009 
clearly underscored that Russia’s long-term foreign policy strategy rests on its energy exports. 
Russia and the EU are closely connected and common rules apply albeit some EU statesmen do not 
believe Moscow always upholds those rules. There are arguably three primary reasons why the EU-
Russia relationship cannot presently move beyond its current boundaries.   
Firstly, the EU-Russia relationship is not one of shared values and norms but one of material origin 
(Freifeld, 2009, pp. 2-4). Secondly, in regards to the Nabucco Project the relationship is based on 
calculations of intentions and capabilities rather than common understanding (Jackson & Sørensen, 
2007, p. 132). Thirdly, it appears that a different understanding of international law and its purpose is 
present. The EU strives for stability in a rule-based community based on Western values while Russia 
aims for a lack of restrictions from international law to be able to conduct its bilateral affairs more 
efficiently. The EU-Russia energy relationship is marred by these calculations as Russia overtly seeks 
to dissuade the Nabucco Project from materialising by attempting to block the “next step”. Either in 
regards to possible suppliers or halting the project by sowing dissent amidst the EU member states. 
While simultaneously playing its own hand with separate, competing projects such as the Nord and 
South Stream projects. 
The EU and the Russian Federation are considered interdependent but as a part of a ‘system of states’. 
They are not part of a ‘society of states’ despite the amount of interaction between them. The evident 
consequences of not belonging in the same ‘society of states’ are that the EU has no firm guarantee that 
Russia will follow the rules and that the two parties compete rather than cooperate .   
The European Commission could arguably be referred to as the image of the EU. This executive body 
has the responsibility for upholding the Union’s treaties and running the EU on a daily basis. As such it 
is their task to safeguard the EU in regards to energy security alongside the individual members. As 
discussed the EU-Russian relationship bears not only a material concern to the EU but also a legal as 
well as norm-driven frustration. The Commission’s choice to emphasise the ‘Southern Gas Corridor’21 
alongside promoting the Nabucco Pipeline as its flagship project shows clear intent to protect its 
‘society of states’ by circumventing Russia.  
                                                             
21 The “Southern Gas Corridor” is the European Commission’s name for the gas supply coming from Middle 
Eastern and Central Asian countries to Europe. Contrary to popular belief the name does not refer to transport 
routes but to countries of origin (Belova, 2010, p. 25)  
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5.1.2 THE RUSSIAN-EU FOREIGN POLICY DISAGREEMENTS 
This section will focus on analysing the fundamental differences between how Russia and the EU 
conduct their foreign policy and some of the disputes that this discrepancy has led to. 
The precarious situation of an overdependence on an essential finite resource is acerbated by the 
fundamental differences between the EU and Russia. The EU uses a norm-driven rule-based approach 
to foreign policy whereas Russia inhabits the more realist or Hobbesian approach (Baev & Øverland, 
2010, p. 1079). In the words of Fraser Cameron: “The EU-Russia relationship does not take place in a 
vacuum. It must be viewed against the wider backdrop of the geopolitical relationship between the West 
and Russia...” (Cameron, 2010, p. 20). 
The disparity creates uncertainty and tension. Russia and the West have clashed on foreign policy 
issues several times in the last two decades: Russian opposition to the NATO bombings of Serbia, the 
West’s recognition of Kosovo, Russian resistance towards Georgian and Ukrainian inclusion into 
NATO, the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 as well as disagreements between Russia and the EU over 
several human rights and trade issues. Disputes like these are some of the reasons why there are 
several EU member states that view Russia as more of a security threat than an ally (Cameron, 2010, p. 
20). 
The EU’s foreign policy preference can be classified as a ‘soft power approach’. The EU can provide 
substantial economic stimuli (trade, aid, investment, etc.) to otherwise impoverished states but will on 
paper at least have demands to the receiving states’ governance, human rights and democratic reform. 
There is also a desire to permanently solve conflicts if possible. Russia cannot match the EU 
economically but with high oil and gas prices swelling its national reserve Russia has been able to 
outmanoeuvre the EU in some countries. Especially since the EU lacks a stern and coherent foreign 
policy. Furthermore Moscow poses no human rights-demands on the autocratic regimes it trades with 
which makes it popular in Central Asia in particular. This is in contrast to the EU that often tries to 
impose human rights and Western values on its trading partners (Adolphsen, 2006, pp. 211-14). The 
fact that several of the countries in Russia’s near abroad are also highly dependent on Russian gas 
enables Moscow to maintain the “frozen conflicts”22 in the regions where they have special influence. 
The “reset” of the relationship between the US and Russia negotiated by Presidents Barack Obama and 
Dmitry Medvedev made it possible to agree on tightened UN sanctions against Iran23. But at the same 
time Russian military presence in Abkhazia, Georgia was strengthened and Russian forces simulated 
                                                             
22 “Frozen conflicts” understood as conflicts that have reached a stalemate with no end in sight. 
23 The agreement on the sanctions was only achievable because Russia was allowed to possibly assist Iran with 
developing its oil and gas sector as well as continue to aid in developing and selling it nuclear power stations. 
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an actual invasion of Poland (Shleifer & Treisman, 2011, pp. 122-23). It is natural for statesmen to be 
concerned with one’s nation and security and preparation is certainly part of any government’s 
responsibilities. But in the case of Poland mentioned above it is the signal of such an occurrence that is 
relevant. History certainly has given these two nations reason to quarrel even today. But since Poland 
is also a member of the EU and of NATO such an exercise sends mixed signals.   
 
5.1.2.1 THE RUSSIA-GEORGIA WAR OF 2008 
The following will summarize the Russian-Georgian war and the disputes over Russia’s intentions with 
its military action in Georgia as an example of the disagreements between Russia and the EU. The war 
was caused some of the more serious recent diplomatic clashes between the EU and Russia and it 
illustrates the sometimes strained diplomatic relationship between them. In the words of Fraser 
Cameron: “For some member states, Russia is the major security threat and the Georgia conflict should be 
regarded as a final wake-up call...”  (Cameron, 2010, p. 21). 
The war was a short 5-day conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. The dispute was 
officially over the semi-autonomous regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and their desire to secede 
from Georgia.  
Georgia was on the verge of being accepted into NATO in 2008 and the war effectively ended that 
ambition. Though this was never the official reason for the war Medvedev has since admitted that this 
was at least the outcome of the war: “If we had wavered in 2008, the geopolitical layout would have been 
different, a range of countries which the North Atlantic [Treaty Organization] tries to artificially ‘protect’ 
would have been within it” (RIA Novosti, 2011). 
It must of course be considered only natural that Moscow opposes all NATO enlargements to the east 
even though the statement does seem to give credence to the many speculations that Russia engaged 
Georgia only to punish the country for trying to become a member of NATO. It is however hardly 
conceivable that any state would greet a historically hostile military alliance up to its border despite 
NATO’s repeatedly uttered peaceful intentions (Shleifer & Treisman, 2011, p. 128).  
The decision to send troops into Georgia was still defended as a humanitarian action and thereby in 
accordance with UN conventions. Acts that are made in accordance with the norms and values of the 
international community are seen as legitimate, but actions that from one side may be viewed as 
legitimate reasons can from another actors viewpoint be seen as illegitimate. Russia tried to make its 
case for war to the international community by listing several arguments. Initially, Russia claimed it 
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was an act of self-defence to protect its peacekeeping force that was under attack by the Georgian 
army in South Ossetia’s capital Tskhinvali. Furthermore, in a letter to the UN Security Council on the 
13th of August 2008, Moscow tried to present Georgian aggression against Russian peacekeepers as an 
attack on the Russian Federation itself. This would justify acts of self-defence under article 51 of the 
UN Charter. Secondly, Russian president Medvedev argued that Georgia’s attack on Tskhinvali was a 
“gross violation of the mandates that the international community gave Russia in the peace process” and 
that the large-scale deployment of troops in South Ossetia was only a “reinforced Russian peacekeeping 
contingent” (Allison, 2008, p. 1151). Another argument more directed at a national audience 
condemned Georgia’s ‘aggression’ in general, but the legal basis for this argument can be credibly 
dismissed since international norms define aggression as a state’s act against another state and South 
Ossetia was not a recognised state. Another version of this argument is that Russia was protecting its 
citizens living abroad24. Russia accused Georgia of conducting genocide in South Ossetia. A very 
serious and emotional accusation that was perhaps used to conjure up images from the Balkans in the 
1990s to link to and justify its actions as similar to the interventions made by the West and NATO in 
that region back then (Allison, 2008, pp. 1151-2). 
The UN concept ‘Responsibility to Protect’ relates to the ‘solidarist’ view in the International Society 
Theory (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, pp. 133-34). It was arguably used in a distorted form by the 
Russian authorities compared to the otherwise intended humanitarian agenda by the West.  
Georgia’s main commercial advantage is as a possible transit country to Nabucco. Georgia is necessary 
as a link between Turkey and the Caspian Sea littoral states . The August War changed the balance of 
power in the region. The massive damage to infrastructure25, the looted military bases, and the South 
Ossetian and Abkhazian enclaves broken off as “independent states” clearly has destabilized Georgia. 
Georgia’s predicament could scare off potential pipeline investors, or most likely delay any further 
monetary commitment and construction. It could be argued this is a part of Moscow’s wider pipeline 
politics and it should rightly concern the EU (Barysch 2, 2010, p. 6) as Georgia is its only current viable 
transit country from Azerbaijan to Turkey and onwards to the EU. At least for the foreseeable future as 
Iran and Armenia are too politically sensitive to be realistic candidates. The conflict could also be 
construed as a general warning to other CIS26 countries to refrain them from negotiating with the 
                                                             
24 This could be seen when Russia handed out Russian passports in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to justify its 
actions (Allison, 2008, p. 1157). 
25 It must be noted though that the Russian army did not damage any pipeline infrastructure. 
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West. The presently negotiated new PCA between the EU and Russia is pre-conditioned on the fact that 
Russia must honour its EU-negotiated peace treaty with Georgia. It thus appears the EU guarantees its 
transit possibilities for the Nabucco Project whilst simultaneously honouring its international 
obligations to ensure the ‘sovereignty of states’ and human rights. Despite international critique the 
Russian presence in the breakaway enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia keeps Georgia from 
entering NATO27, puts a pressure on the CIS and also endangers the EU plans of using Georgia as a 
transit country for the Nabucco pipeline. The conflict is therefore seen by some as a reason why Russia 
cannot be trusted and why diversification away from Russia is essential. Foreign policy is conducted 
and possibly perceived differently by the EU than it is by Russia and this creates tension and 
uncertainty between the two.  
 
5.1.3 RUSSIA AS A SUPPLIER 
Many speculations exist whether Russia is a stable supplier to the EU and whether Moscow has 
intentions beyond the lucrative trade profits. Such relevant contemplations will be analysed in this 
section. It will be monitored as well whether Russia can continue to supply the EU’s projected growing 
gas demands. 
In evaluating Russia as a supplier, it is necessary to scrutinize the political nature of pipeline projects. 
Big pipeline projects have evolved from being strictly a private business venture to being a matter of 
‘strategic infrastructure’. The politicization of energy has of course had implications on the EU-Russian 
gas relationship. 
Since the first oil crisis in 1973/74 neither the EU nor its individual member states have encouraged 
political factors to take precedence over market forces. The profit motives that drive companies 
however have a tendency to be guided by short-term economic gains. This has meant that national 
interests concerning energy security on the mid- to long-term basis have been neglected by energy 
companies and national governments alike. The picture changes from member state to member state 
but the attitude towards energy import and towards Russia was roughly following the economic-
political views listed below at least until the first Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis in 2005-2006:  
                                                             
27 One of the requirements of NATO accession is a non-hostile domestic atmosphere as NATO is a strictly 
interstate security organisation. (NATO, 1999) 
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 “Oil and gas are exclusively economic goods, not strategic ones. Accordingly, energy resources are 
not part of the foreign and security policy strategy of other countries, and the energy policies of 
other countries strictly adhere to the rules of market economics. 
 The security of the energy supply is no longer an important factor and can be left to private utility 
companies. 
 Disruptions in regional or global energy supply can be offset by other oil and gas imports at any 
time. 
 Russia under President Putin has steadily strengthened its market orientation. 
 Never having used energy exports as a political weapon even during the Cold War, Russia will 
always prove to be a reliable energy partner for Europe. 
 Russia’s need to export its oil and gas to the European market has led to mutual dependence that 
precludes the instrumentalisation of Russian energy and pipeline policy as a factor of foreign 
policy in the age of globalisation “ (Umbach, 2010, pp. 1229-30) 
In other words the view on Russia was that they were a safe, stable supplier and that the mutual 
dependence born out of the common interests between the EU and Russia helped bring Russia closer 
to the Western ideal of free market economics. The 2006 gas crisis changed this perception as many 
Europeans began to alter their view on Russia and on energy security, from Russia being perceived as 
a reliable supplier to that of a hard line petrostate for whom commercial obligations were second to 
that of political priorities (Freifeld, 2009, p. 4). In Russia the national priorities, energy politics and 
private company interests are now firmly interwoven. The nation’s top officials who also serve on the 
boards of the major corporations mostly have narrow-minded interests, ranging from urging their 
companies to fully dominate markets, to acquire assets abroad as well as to utilize the corrupt 
atmosphere in the Russian energy sector to reward their friends in management (Shleifer & Treisman, 
2011, p. 127). It is not unlikely that western companies or democratic politicians separately could be 
blamed for similar approaches but not all of them are concentrated at one governing body. That is the 
fundamental difference, because in Russia the people who rule it also own it. (Lucas, 2008, pp. 258-
59).  
Despite rising concerns, individual member states are still unable to converge on a common foreign 
policy towards Russia and key members such as Germany and France are reluctant to implement the 
necessary proposals for an EU strategy. The Commission on the other hand has steadily increased its 
resolve since 2006 with its politicization of the Nabucco Project. The Commission has also long 
championed the principles of liberalisation of the market and fashioned proposals that if implemented 
would reduce the grip of national energy companies. The Commission warned Gazprom that it would 
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face ‘competition policy’ measures within the EU and be denied access to downstream assets 
(Cameron, 2010, p. 26). Mr. Putin responded thusly: “The gas pipeline system is the creation of the 
Soviet Union. We intend to retain state control over the gas transport system and over Gazprom. We will 
not split Gazprom up. And the European Commission should not have any illusions. In the gas sector, they 
will have to deal with the state.” (Lucas, 2008, p. 212). The Commission retorted with raids on 
Gazprom’s European offices under allegations of antitrust violations28 (White & Shiryaevskaya, 
Bloomberg, 2011). 
Due to the common norms and understanding of the overall importance of market forces in the EU the 
separation of economics from politics was sensible, at least in the past. But presently pipeline politics 
formed outside the EU are more than ever defined by geopolitical and strategic interests of national 
foreign and security policies (Umbach, 2010, p. 30). This is the main reasoning for the Commission’s 
adoption of the Nabucco Pipeline  as its flagship project.     
 
5.1.3.1  THE DESTINATION CLAUSE 
Chris Rogers, an analyst of Bloomberg Industries, mentions that regulators from the EU are likely to 
focus on the “destination clauses” in Gazprom’s long-term contracts signed with members of the EU in 
the 1980-90’s. These clauses prevent gas importers from re-selling the gas they have purchased to 
third parties. The clauses are however now in conflict with new EU rules that encourage gas to be sold 
across the entire bloc of nation states (White & Shiryaevskaya, Bloomberg, 2011). The nature of the 
Russian destination clause is highly speculative as it seemingly employs a built-in control element to 
gas trade. It presents several complications especially for the ability to establish a more secure and 
liberal energy market in the EU. The clause appears to be an instrument to further the reliance on 
Russia via bilateral agreements and enable easier usage of energy supply as political leverage (Shleifer 
& Treisman, 2011, p. 130).  
Russia’s destination clauses prevent the EU members from trading gas freely within the EU market.  
This creates an inflexibility where oversupply of Russian gas in one part of the EU cannot be shifted to 
a country that may need more gas. Russia is hereby unintentionally pushing the EU towards 
diversifying their supply away from Russian gas. 
 
5.1.3.2 RUSSIA’S INABILITY TO MEET THE EU’S RISING DEMANDS 
                                                             
28 See subsection 6.4.1 for more 
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The Russian socio-economic progress is closely linked to that of its large-scale development of its 
natural resources. Russia may not be able to increase their production enough to meet the rising 
demands of the EU. For even though Russia has the largest proven gas reserves in the world it has 
been questioned whether they are even able to expand their current production. There are two factors 
making analysts unsure of Russia’s ability to increase their exports: Firstly, development of fields such 
as those of the Yamal and Shtokman deposits in the Barents Sea has been delayed, which is 
problematic since the production of major fields such as the Urengoy and Yamburg has been rapidly 
declining since 2005. Secondly, Russia’s domestic consumption is steadily increasing along with the 
economic growth of its economy and an increase in the general gasification of Russia (Christie, 2009, 
pp. 7-8). Russia’s production is currently at an all-time high (BP, 2012, p. 22) and if the massive Yamal 
and Stockman fields reach their potential Russia will have plenty of gas for the foreseeable future. But 
cracks are showing in Gazprom’s armour and this is bound to be disconcerting to the EU.  
The EU’s great hope of a real strategic energy partnership with Moscow seems gone considering the 
differing of opinions. Even so a partnership in any form is understood as a long-term vision because of 
the necessity for Russian gas. The increasing uncertainty whether Moscow will be unable to increase 
its gas exports beyond 180–200 bcm after 2020 is naturally a concern. The potential gas shortage has 
been acknowledged by President Putin himself in September 2006 as well as by representatives of 
Russia’s economic and resource ministries. Putin developed an alternative plan by expanding nuclear 
power and coal consumption for its domestic market to fulfil Russia’s gas export obligations. In other 
words, if Russia can’t deliver, the EU may be forced to diversify its gas imports in the near future in any 
case (Umbach, 2010, p. 1236) - whether through Nabucco or through other sources. 
 
5.1.3.3 THE EU-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP AND CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT 
Disagreements over the Partnership and Co-Operation Agreement (PCA) between Russia and the EU 
have posed certain problems for the trade relationship between the two. The PCA is an agreement that 
is intended to regulate political and economic relations between the actors as well as to provide a legal 
basis for the EU members’ bilateral investments and trade agreements with Russia (European 
Commission, 2012). The first PCA was signed in 1994 and came into effect in late 1997. It has since 
been the overall framework for the EU-Russia relationship. The EU and Russia are currently 
attempting to renegotiate the PCA in an attempt to resolve some of the issues with the current PCA. 
The EU has signed PCA’s with other states in its close proximity as part of its neighbourhood policy 
including the Caucasus region and some central Asian countries and each PCA is tailored to the 
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individual country. The EU’s PCA with Russia is of a different design, as they require to be recognized 
as equals to the EU (Konoplyyanik, 2009, p. 268). This situation has created certain benefits for Russia 
especially in the hydrocarbon trade. This means that Russian exports to the EU are almost consistently 
exempt from restrictions of any kind.  In addition to this the existing rules provide more flexibility for 
Russia to apply tariff control on imports from the EU (European Commission, 2012). A new PCA to 
ensure further cooperation and trade has been sought by both sides for years. The context is however 
debated as the two sides differ on what is considered the most relevant. The EU has required a further 
focus on the energy section in the new treaty. This is most likely the result of the growing unease 
towards Russia’s gas cut-offs, obvious obstruction to the Nabucco Project and general unclear motives 
of the Russian state towards the European energy market.  
The EU’s criteria for successfully renegotiating the PCA rests on a ‘package deal’ sort of speaking as 
they require all the suggested and agreed upon new incentives implemented simultaneously. This 
includes the so-called four ‘common spaces’ which are intended to integrate the EU and Russia further:  
1. economics and energy  
2. foreign and security policy 
3. internal security and justice 
4. education and culture 
(Barysch 2, 2010, pp. 1-2).   
Progress is lacking mainly because the presently most debated area - ‘trade and energy’ - remains 
wholly undecided. The interdependence between the EU and Russia in the field of energy should make 
for a stabilizing factor in these energy negotiations. But the fact is that energy constitutes the main 
obstacle to agreement (Baev & Øverland, 2010, p. 1082).  
Some progress has been made though as Poland and Lithuania no longer obstructs the EU-Russia 
negotiations on grounds of Russian “bullying.” (Barysch 2, 2010, p. 1) The EU has also ensured that 
Russia can join the WTO after the EU has negotiated with Georgia to make it withdraw its veto against 
Russian accession to full membership (Barysch 2, 2010, pp. 1-2). The new PCA will have the WTO as its 
foundation to adhere to its internationally cemented rules (Aseeva, 2011, p. 58). The international 
legality of the WTO is understood to have an influence but when the loaded phrases ‘national interests’ 
and ‘critical infrastructure’ are used to justify state actions even that can be circumvented. These are 
terms invoked by Russia to limit FDI in Russia. The fact is that only few established guidelines exist for 
FDI. It is a politically charged and increasing problem unlikely to be solved anytime soon in the 
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international community as opinions clearly diverge between state leaders (Bremmer & Roubini, 
2011, p. 6). 
The EU had anticipated and hoped for the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) - a multilateral framework for 
energy investment and trade - to become the basis for energy negotiations in the new PCA in 
conjunction with the WTO. This would potentially have a substantial de-monopolising impact on 
Russia’s export pipelines and for that same reason Putin has consistently made it plain since 2000 that 
Russia would not ratify the ECT (Lucas, 2008, p. 213). Russia withdrew officially from the ECT in 2009 
and without the addition of the ECT the WTO clauses on energy-related issues are less concrete and 
thus not a guarantee that energy stability between the EU and Russia can be maintained. Moscow has 
only signed but not ratified the ECT and it is therefore disputed whether Russia is bound by the treaty 
(Erixon, 2009).  
States in general are worried about committing themselves to treaties as they know that they will be 
bound by the terms. And Russia’s reluctance to enter into the ECT and a new PCA shows that rules do 
matter (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 154). But despite those common rules residing in the 
international space and their effect on how states-people conduct their affairs, such rules cannot 
directly dictate sovereign states to disregard their national interests or concerns. Russia seems to 
follow the rules by avoiding binding agreements and manipulate with the ones that they are part of if 
they threaten their national energy strategy. 
The EU and Russia remain in a stalemate. Russia is unwilling to accept the EU regulations and the EU is 
equally reluctant to converge with Russia’s norms (Barysch 2, 2010, p. 2).Negotiations on the new PCA 
as a strategic partnership where common values are also part of the foundation is therefore beginning 
to look implausible. The EU-Russian relationship must be considered likely to continue on a path of 
necessity, but not one of agreement. 
  
5.1.3.4 THE RUSSO–UKRAINIAN GAS CONFLICTS 
This section will analyse the causes of the gas disputes between Russia and the Ukraine that occurred 
in the mid 2000’s and determine their effect on the EU-Russia relationship as well as the disputes’ 
possible effect on the Nabucco Project. Critics have argued that Russia neglected its obligations as a 
responsible supplier and main provider of gas to the EU. Others argue that it was rather the Ukraine 
who via its position as the primary transit country of Russian gas to Europe attempted to further its 
own national policy at the expense of the EU. No matter who is to blame the outcome was that the 
dispute ended up severely damaging the EU’s gas supply. The crises are essential as it will be argued 
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that they were the main catalyst in making the Nabucco Project a politicized issue instead of just a 
business venture. 
It never entered the minds of Soviet planners that Ukraine would someday not be part of Russia or at 
the very least not be under the control of Moscow. As such it seemed logical at the time to make 
Ukraine the major focal point of its wider pipeline infrastructure into Europe; Problems arose 
however when the Orange Revolution in 2004 saw the Kremlin’s favoured candidate ousted from 
office and accused of election fraud and voter intimidation. The new president - Viktor Yushchenko - 
aimed at moving the Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic orbit (Freifeld, 2009, p. 4). This suddenly became a 
possible threat to Russia’s main outlet into Europe which accounted for roughly 80% of its combined 
export capacity into the EU gas market. Given the extent to which the Russian state budget depends on 
this trade losing access to its clients in Europe would be a catastrophe (Shleifer & Treisman, 2011, p. 
126). Putin advocated that since the Ukraine longed to become a Western country it should also pay 
the much higher ‘netback value’ prices  (Freifeld, 2009, p. 4).  The demanded price increase from €42 
per thousand cubic metre to around €130 was a blow to Ukraine and they argued that their companies 
would be unprofitable if they should pay more than €73. It can naturally be argued that Russia always 
had allowed the Ukraine to pay far less than the standard European prices and as such was entitled to 
raise them (Shleifer & Treisman, 2011, p. 130). But the manner and timeframe for such a request was 
highly controversial.  
To make matters worse the Ukraine had then argued that the transit fees it received should also be 
raised to the level of the Western countries. This was combined with a refusal to allow Gazprom any 
ownership in the Ukraine’s gas transportation and storage assets. Neither decision was met with 
appreciation in Moscow. Yet another source of disagreement was Ukraine’s alleged siphoning of gas 
from Gazprom. When Kiev refused to purchase gas at the heightened price at the given deadline 
Moscow shut of the gas for four days during the winter in 2006 (Stern, 2006, s. 12-16).  
The matter divided the EU as some saw the conflict as the fault of the Ukraine which was seen as acting 
irresponsibly. It was argued that the Ukraine was abusing its position as a key transit country to 
disrupt the flow of otherwise reliable Russian gas. Others again saw Russia as the aggressor placing 
the Ukraine in an impossible situation (Freifeld, 2009, p. 5). In respect to both views on the matter 
both the Nord Stream, South Stream Project, and especially the Nabucco Project grew instantly in 
popularity. Russia used the crisis to advocate the urgency of circumventing Ukraine and to allow 
Russia direct access to the EU via Nord Stream and South Stream. Both of these projects though also 
brought concern to some EU members due to the controversial political intentions that may also be 
involved with these otherwise economically motivated constructs. Nord and South Stream would 
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circumvent the Moscow-critical Poland as well as possibly block the Nabucco Project (Cameron, 2010, 
p. 23). Moscow has always insinuated that the Ukraine is part of Russia’s sphere of influence and it 
could be argued that this spat was as much about politics as economic gains (Cameron, 2010, p. 24). 
The cut-off which occurred January 1st in the dead of winter was accused of being timed for maximum 
effect on ordinary citizens.  
The second incident started out as another pricing dispute between Russia and the Ukraine. Gazprom 
refused to guarantee gas supplies for 2009 unless the national Ukrainian gas company Naftogaz paid 
its debts for previous supplies. The dispute then escalated to a quarrel over the price Ukraine should 
pay for 2009 and to another transit dispute as well. The EU was once again side-lined and could only 
observe the debacle with growing frustration (Cameron, 2010, p. 24). Ukraine had clearly made a 
number of mistakes but Russia’s solution of shutting down all gas transfers through Ukraine must be 
considered a harsh resolve – once again in January in the midst of winter. This time the crisis was both 
deeper and more prolonged than the one before and as a result not only the Ukraine but also much of 
the Eastern European member states experienced severe economic damage due to their over-
dependence on Russian gas. The shutdown lasted almost two weeks compared to the four days in 
2006. Bulgaria the poorest EU member and the one most reliant on Russian gas lost around 250 
million euro’s as a direct result of the shut-offs effect on its industry. But most of South-Eastern Europe 
was markedly hit (Christie, 2009, p. 17). Taking into consideration that the crisis cost Russia around 
€1.2-1.6 billion in revenue it is argued that its actions were not politically motivated. It was more an 
act of desperation than an actual power play to make Kiev comply (Shleifer & Treisman, 2011, p. 130). 
Howeveer if this was the case there would have been other ways to address the matter such as 
consulting the EU for one. The EU and Russia have had an energy dialogue since 2000 which have had 
no affect concerning crisis management whatsoever. The 2006 gas dispute ended with the installation 
of an ‘early warning mechanism’ that was intended to ensure a stable supply in the event of a similar 
situation. When such a situation arose in 2009 the early warning mechanism was completely ignored 
by Moscow. EU officials were baffled by the lack of transparency between Moscow and Kiev and the 
indifference towards their EU clients (Cameron, 2010, pp. 18-22). The 2009 gas crisis was clearly a low 
point in the energy relations between Russia and the EU. The event resulted in a lasting stain on Russia 
as a supplier. Serious debates heated up again not only on diversification of routes to circumvent 
Ukraine but also on diversification away from Russia. It seems that Russia despite its dependence on 
the EU and its obligations as a supplier chose to prioritise its national infrastructural and political 
agenda (Vahtra, 2009, s. 162-63). The 2009 incident crossed a line that even made member states 
normally sympathetic to Russia doubt the country’s reliability as a supplier. Commission President 
Barrosso and nine fellow commissioners went to Moscow after the crisis and attended a high profile 
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meeting on the 6th of February 2009. The damage done to the EU as a direct result of the Russia-
Ukraine gas crisis was a point of emphasis. It was also made clear that it would be many years before 
Moscow would be judged as a reliable supplier again (Cameron, 2010, p. 22 & 26). 
5.1.4 THE EASTERN EUROPEAN OVER-DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIA  
Nabucco is seen as especially important for the Eastern European EU - countries currently overly 
dependent on Russian gas imports (See Figure 5-3). Countries like, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, , 
Estonia, Latvia,  Lithuania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland are currently depending on Russia for 
between 59% to 100% of their gas. The head of the Institute for Regional and International Studies 
Ognyan Minchev summed up the present situation for one of the most dependent EU countries: “The 
Bulgarian government is obedient to Russia... Bulgaria has put the entire energy system in Russian 
hands.” (Freifeld, 2009, pp. 5-6).  Countries such as Bulgaria suffered greatly during the Russian-
Ukraine disputes of 2006 and especially the one in 2009 (Christie, 2009, p. 17).  
FIGURE 5-3 EU MEMBER STATES’ DEPENDENCY ON RUSSIAN GAS IMPORTS (BP, 2011)29 
 
                                                             
29 It should be noted that Latvia and Estonia are excluded from this list as there is insufficient data on their 
consumption, but they are expected to be about as dependent on Russian gas as the neighbouring Lithuania. 
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A large part of Russia’s political ‘divide and rule’ energy strategy30 rests on the fact that the EU is not 
systematically connected by pipes. But this is something that a broader regional strategy envisaged by 
the Commission could ensure. The Baltics are for example characterised as an “energy island” as they 
are not connected to the broader EU energy grid. But the problem is not isolated to the Baltics. On the 
contrary it is visible in much of the Eastern EU. During the time of the 2009 spat between Russia and 
the Ukraine the lack of interconnectors in the EU became obvious for all spectators. A Commission 
official predicted that more interconnectors would completely remove the problem of security of 
supply (Chaffin, 2011). But to further underscore the predicament an almost absurd situation was 
allowed to occur. There was abundant gas in the UK, Germany and Spain due to the financial crisis and 
the causal effect of excess energy production and import contra the lowered demand. But these stores 
of surplus gas had no link to reach the EU citizens in Eastern Europe whom were cut off from Russian 
gas during the crisis.  
 
5.1.5 PART-CONCLUSION 
The EU and Russia are interdependent but it is a trade of necessity not of want. They share very few 
common values and this decreases the trust between them. Politicians in the EU expected the massive 
trade and political interaction between the EU and Russia to spill over into other more soft political 
areas such as human rights and make otherwise self-interested national political elites eager to 
intensify cooperation (Lucas, 2008, pp. 191-92). In addition to this the integration was meant to make 
political actors shift their loyalties away from a strictly state-centric view “...toward a new center whose 
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states.” (Haas, 1958, p. 16). The 
members of the EU were clearly hoping for this effect and were shocked to discover that Russia was 
not leaning towards becoming more integrated into Western institutions. The EU’s Neighbourhood 
Policy is built on this premise and the European Commission itself is the outcome of exactly such a 
step from a group of interdependent sovereign European states. As its primary function the 
Commission seeks to enhance the interests of the EU as a whole rather than focus on the individual 
states they each hail from. The EU’s first foreign policy attempt towards Russia rested on these tenets 
and even the present foreign policy is inspired by the possibility of change in the Russian leadership 
(Barysch 2, 2010, pp. 3-4). The EU and Russia has since then struggled to agree on regulatory 
agreements such as the new PCA and the ECT.  
                                                             
30 More on Russia’s “divide and rule” strategy in section 6.4? 
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The common laws in the energy relationship between the EU and Russia must thus be considered 
driven out of a principle of material state interest and not norms. So common rules are accepted but 
not equally welcomed by both parties. 
That Russia’s reliability as a supplier has been put into question only adds to the worries for the EU. 
The gas shut-offs of 2006 and 2009 resulted in the EU Commission developing its ‘Southern Gas 
Corridor’ strategy and Russia has unintentionally helped politicize the Nabucco Project. The Eastern 
EU is already over-dependent on Russian gas and states like Bulgaria and Lithuania felt the 
consequences during the Russo-Ukrainian disputes. Russia has let quarrels with transit countries 
affect their gas deliveries to the EU and when combining this with the fact that Russia may be unable 
to meet the demands of the EU’s rising gas consumption, this results in the EU Commission turning to 
diversification through the Nabucco Project as a necessary solution.  
 
5.2 HOW THE NABUCCO PROJECT COULD BENEFIT THE EU 
It has been established that the EU Commission and several members of the EU see the dependency on 
Russian gas as problematic. The region’s other major gas exporters like Algeria and Norway are not 
able to substantially increase their gas production so alternatives supplies are needed. Interconnectors 
have been argued as the solution to EU’s dependency problem. But most interconnectors only have a 
very limited capacity and therefore would only be able to lower the present energy security dilemma 
of Eastern Europe. In any case the various interconnector programmes subsidised by money from the 
EU stimulus package have only seen little progress (Barysch, 2010, pp. 6-7). This also includes the new 
member states that are the most vulnerable when it comes to Russian supply cut-offs and whom 
would otherwise have been the most eager to obtain options to lower this dependence. The often 
hostile political climate that persists between Moscow and the Baltics, Poland and Czech Republic 
makes these states even more anxious to diversify away from Russian supplies (Baev & Øverland, 
2010, pp. 1082-83).  
So how can the EU lessen this dependency? Winston Churchill once said: "Safety and certainty in oil lie 
in variety and variety alone." (Yergin, 2006, p. 69). The message about the security a nation can find 
through diversifying its energy resources is clear, even though Mr. Churchill was speaking about oil. 
For the most part foreign energy imports are not considered uncertain or unstable but the fact is that 
it’s an ever-present possibility. In the case of Europe gas imports have persisted for a long time as 
(West-) Germany already began importing gas from the USSR. The Yeltsin years where Russia 
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appeared to be shifting towards a more democratic direction encouraged further association with 
Russia. In this context it must also be mentioned that despite the Cold War and the tumult of the 
Yeltsin era Russia remained a stable supplier which can only have encouraged further trade linkages. 
But as illustrated in recent sections the Putin era slowly changed this image to such an extent that the 
EU must now consider Russia’s trade, and role as exporter interwoven with its foreign policy goals 
(Christie, 2009, pp. 11-14). Domestic sources of energy are preferable, if available and obtainable31 but 
most members simply do not have that option. 
Gas is the preferred heating source in Europe (Freifeld, 2009, p. 1) as well as the possible means to 
reach the EU’s 20-20-20 goals. Yet most EU members are required to import this from foreign sources. 
It could be argued that the issue of ‘security of supply’ would make it possible to lessen the emphasis 
on the economic factor and focus consistently on the actual availability of fossil fuels. With this view 
diversification would be to achieve a ‘security of supply’ even if it means a short-term increase in 
economic or diplomatic expenses. But energy security remains not only linked to availability but also 
to affordability (Yergin, 2006, pp. 70-71). Taking this into consideration dependence on LNG imports 
is not a long-term solution as static pipelines will remain the cheapest option for the next two decades 
(Johnson, 2011). That is the reason why the EU has officially declared the Commission’s ‘Southern Gas 
Corridor’ initiative fundamental to its fledgling energy security policy (Barysch, 2010, pp. 5-6). The 
phrase was first coined in the Second Strategic Energy Review in 2008 (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008). The strategy has also been nicknamed ‘The New Silk Road’ due to the fact that 
the route to the potential supplier countries runs along this route of old. Projects like the 
Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy pipeline (ITGI, The trans-Adriatic pipeline (TAP), the White 
Stream pipeline and of course the Nabucco Pipeline Project are all examples of the ‘Southern Corridor’ 
initiative. Still, the Nabucco Pipeline remains the leading project to this strategy (Barysch, 2010, p. 14). 
It is the largest and the most able to bring sufficient quantities of gas from new importers.  
 
5.2.1 THE NABUCCO PROJECT 
The Nabucco Project was already initiated in 2002 but at the time the pipeline was just a business 
venture visualized by Austrian and Turkish energy companies. In 2006 it became politicized and the 
Commission recognized the need for closer cooperation with suppliers. The EU took an extra interest 
in widening its energy dialogues both with bordering states but also those of the Middle East and 
Caspian littoral actors (Umbach, 2010, p. 1237). Nabucco in its own right is massive - the largest 
                                                             
31 This will be discussed further in subsection 6.5.2 “The developments in shale gas”  
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energy project ever undertaken in the EU. It is an approximately 3900 kilometre long natural gas 
pipeline that is scheduled to run from Baumgarten An Der March in Austria through Hungary, 
Romania and Bulgaria through to Ahiboz in Turkey where it will split in two32, with one part going 
south towards Iraq and the other going north through Erzurum, Turkey to Georgia where it can 
connect to the Caucasus littoral states. At full capacity the pipeline is scheduled to transport 31 bcm of 
natural gas to Europe (Erdogdu, 2010, p. 2 & 10).  
The Nabucco Project is greatly favoured and supported by the Eastern European members. This is 
possibly because of its special legal regime. It is built on an EU rule set that require the pipeline 
owners to sell access to their pipeline on the market. As one EU official sums it up “Nabucco has built-
in solidarity” (Barysch, 2010, p. 7). It can reverse the flow of gas if needed, with safety procedures 
unlike Nord-stream and South Stream. Another cut-off from the East would then be mitigated by gas 
flowing in from the massive gas hub Baumgarten that is the end point of Nabucco (Barysch, 2010, pp. 
7-8). Interconnectors are a natural part of the Nabucco Project as well but its main strength can be 
argued to be of a geo-political nature as the pipeline runs through two of those most affected by its 
total dependence on Russia namely Hungary and Bulgaria. 
Nabucco has produced an efficient legal regime through years of negotiating. It is ready to be applied 
should the project get the final green light. The prospect of this ability to lower the dependence on 
Russian gas both in regards to a relatively short-term interest but certainly as a long-term strategy is 
arguably the reason the Commission has appointed Nabucco as its flagship project. The Commission is 
also the main driving force promoting it as there is an evident lack of support from the larger EU 
member states (Baev & Øverland, 2010, p. 1077). In this light it can also be viewed as a prestige 
project. It is at least true to the extent that it can be viewed as a test case for large scale infrastructure 
projects under EU regulation. This particularly concerns the EU’s new ‘regulatory unbundling’ system 
which aims at breaking up vertical integration (Barysch, 2010, p. 4). Russia for one clings to its 
monopolistic practice and seeks to expand it despite growing resentment on the subject from the EU at 
large.  
It is important to emphasize that even at the event of completion the Nabucco Project will not diminish 
the EU’s reliance on foreign resources, since the pipeline is scheduled to be supplied by natural gas 
from Middle Eastern- and/or Central Asian countries. Considering the regimes in Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan it could be argued - as some sceptics have done - that Russia will be a much more secure 
choice as exporter. But the primary idea is to diversify the supply and lessen the dependency on a 
                                                             
32 It was originally scheduled to split in three sections with one going to Iran. This part was later scrapped 
though it could have been the most valuable to the EU. This will be analysed further in subsection 6.2.1 on Iran.  
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single supply source – or state. As the two incidents in 2006 and 2009 suggest, if one source fails even 
temporarily it can have a disastrous effect on the EU. Had the Nabucco Project been implemented at in 
2006 it would have been able to, despite its maximum capacity of 31bcm, at the very least mitigate the 
impact. 
 “DIVERSIFICATION WILL REMAIN THE FUNDAMENTAL STARTING 
PRINCIPLE OF ENERGY SECURITY (…) YET ENERGY SECURITY ALSO 
EXISTS IN A LARGER CONTEXT. IN A WORLD OF INCREASING 
INTERDEPENDENCE, ENERGY SECURITY WILL DEPEND MUCH ON HOW 
COUNTRIES MANAGE THEIR RELATIONS WITH ONE ANOTHER, WHETHER 
BILATERALLY OR WITHIN MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORKS.” 
 (Yergin, 2006, p. 82).  
It can be argued that the EU is a caged market as it faces a limited amount of competitive suppliers. 
The monopolistic encroachment of Gazprom further aggravates this already present problem 
(Cameron, 2010, p. 23). There is no central government as such in the EU or any other higher legal 
authority to effectively protect against Russian market power. It remains to be seen whether 
regulations at all can constrain a gas supplier the size of Russia. The best alternative then might be the 
suggestion of competitive pressure  (Erdogdu, 2010, p. 23). Joschka Fischer, a former German foreign 
minister closely affiliated with Nabucco argues that it is a crucial project that is urgently needed to 
stop what he perceives as Moscow’s “divide and conquer politics” in the EU (Freifeld, 2009, p. 2). All 
considered Nabucco seems to be a necessary project to attempt to break Russia’s monopoly or lower 
its influence on the EU energy market. The possible inflow of gas from new suppliers would as such 
likely alter the interdependence status quo. 
 
5.2.2 THE CAPACITY OF THE NABUCCO PIPELINE 
Those were some of the reasons why the European Commission sees the Southern Corridor as a 
necessity and why the Nabucco pipeline could help remedy some of the supply and dependence 
worries. The Nabucco Project’s critics are many however and especially the pipeline’s size is a point of 
contention with some claiming it is too small to matter and others arguing that it is too big to be 
completed. The critics of the Nabucco pipeline point out that even at full capacity the Nabucco pipeline 
will supply only 31 bcm per year. This is only a trifle compared to the between 450-500 bcm the EU 
consumes annually (BP, 2012, p. 23) without taking growing demands into account. It is therefore 
clear the Nabucco Project would not replace Russia by any means. The Nabucco Project is the largest 
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infrastructure project ever envisaged by the EU. It has led some critics to argue that the project may be 
too expensive to be completed and that the EU should aim for a lower capacity or another project 
altogether. Katinka Barysch quotes gas analyst John Roberts’33 opinion that a smaller project could 
actually pave the way for Nabucco by possibly creating a link to Turkmenistan. However small this 
connection might be it would in his opinion make investors keener to make Nabucco follow suit as 
well as create a more serious atmosphere about the EU’s energy intentions. Others again argue that a 
smaller pipeline would ruin the possibility of Nabucco emerging afterwards as it would cast doubts to 
its durability (Barysch, 2010, p. 15). 
 
5.2.3 PART-CONCLUSION 
The EU cannot remain dependent on a supplier that it deems unreliable. Interconnectors would 
remedy the Eastern EU’s overreliance on Russian gas, but diversification through new pipelines seems 
to be the cheapest and most reliable long-term investment for the EU. The arguments about Nabucco’s 
size and price tag are valid and the EU’s accessibility to possible suppliers across the Caspian remains 
to be seen. Also it is true that the Nabucco even at full capacity will not come close to replacing the 110 
bcm that the EU is currently importing from Russia. It would however be able to put a dent in that 
number and possibly guarantee that the EU at least can lessen further imports from Russia if and when 
the consumption increases. A third of the gas (around 10 bcm) is already earmarked for the transit 
countries to the line like Hungary and Bulgaria, some of the EU’s most dependent on Russian imports 
(Barysch 2010:7). This could in itself help alleviate the threat posed by Russia’s dominant in these 
countries’ gas sectors.  
                                                             
33 John Roberts is a specialist in the inter-relationship between energy issues and politics. 
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6 ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS THAT ARE DELAYING THE NABUCCO 
PROJECT 
The factors that are impeding the Nabucco Pipeline Project and keeping it from being built are the 
topics of this chapter. The chapter will mainly answer the question of the second part of the problem 
statement that asks “Why has the Nabucco Pipeline still not been implemented?” 
With news surfacing of alternative, shorter versions of the Nabucco pipeline, like the Nabucco West34 
(Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH, 2012) several analysts are currently considering the 
Nabucco Project closer to being dead and buried than it is to being completed. The factors that may 
have impeded Nabucco’s continuation as a project and could potentially lead to its untimely demise 
will be analysed in the following. First there will be a look at the consequences for Russia if the EU 
manages to diversify. Russia’s interests in maintaining the balance of the interdependence relationship 
with the EU are important as they help explain some of Russia’s actions to counteract the Nabucco 
Project. 
The section is followed by a look at the potential suppliers of the Nabucco pipeline in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia and the problems that have surfaced in the Nabucco consortium’s efforts to sign 
agreements with them. 
In section 6.3 follows an analysis of the different national interests within the European Union and the 
internal disputes that have emerged from this interest discrepancy. Then in section 6.4 it will be 
argued that Russia has used this internal dispute to their advantage by attempting to divide the EU 
member states.  
Lastly the chapter will look at some of the developments in the global natural gas market and how the 
changes such as the emergence of shale gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) are affecting the demand 
for diversification in Europe.  
 
 
 
                                                             
34 See subsection 6.5.4 
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6.1 THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE NABUCCO PROJECT ON RUSSIA 
The Nabucco Project may support the EU in several ways but it simultaneously poses a serious 
predicament for Russia. The pipeline is not only economically problematic to Moscow but it potentially 
compromises its entire national strategy of revival. In this section the Nabucco project will be analysed 
strictly from a Russian perspective. It will be argued that Moscow will go to great lengths to prevent 
the Nabucco Project from materialising. This will naturally have an impact on the project’s success rate 
either by discouraging some member states from supporting Nabucco or ironically, by unintentionally 
heightening the support for the project. 
The Commission as a political actor is not inclined to use a geopolitical perspective to govern its 
bilateral interactions which stands in stark contrast to Russia’s strategy (Baev & Øverland, 2010, p. 
1079). For Russia it must be implied that security is paramount and as such any approach towards its 
perceived sphere of influence is a threat.  
The massive hydrocarbon reserves of Russia alongside its high paying and dependent customers in the 
EU are not only an option for Russia to preserve its desired position as a global actor (Buzan & Wæver, 
Regions and Powers, 2003, pp. 434-36) but arguably its only option. 
As Putin advocates there is no substitute for its resource industry as a means for Russia to reach its 
geo-political goals. It must therefore be considered an essential element in all foreign policy related 
negotiations and actions to promote and strengthen Russia’s ability to continue to rely on its colossal 
gas reserves for political success.  
To guarantee such an outcome the EU member states must be prevented from diversifying their 
supply of gas  (Lucas, 2008, p. 211). For a country like Russia where energy exports make up an 
overwhelming share of the government revenues it is important to maintain and secure its demand – 
also known as "security of demand" (Yergin, 2006, p. 71). Russia must assert its hold on the 
international gas market by obtaining as much influence over potential or present suppliers to the EU 
(Barysch, 2010, p. 8) and try to make that sizeable weight count in the EU (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, 
pp. 106-7). Russia does this by acquiring storage and distribution capabilities - ‘downstream assets’ - 
(Lucas, 2008, pp. 211-12) in the EU to secure control from extraction point to consumer outlet which 
will be analysed in subsection 6.4.1. Last but not least Moscow must ensure that high oil and gas prices 
are here to stay as that is the direct link to Russia’s success. Resource-nationalism is threatening to the 
WTO order and stability on the global energy market especially during crisis but it serves Russian 
interests as it aims at keeping prices up (Umbach, 2010, pp. 1231-34).    
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This is where the Complex interdependence theory could be criticized. The common interests of the 
EU and Russia which they have in their mutually beneficial gas trade should strengthen their 
relationship and create a bond between them. The reality is that national interests take over and both 
Russia and the EU try to win the ‘upper hand’ in their mutual dependency. The EU Commission is 
trying to diversify and Moscow is trying to at least maintain the status quo of their current trade.  
The financial crisis hit Russia harder than most other large emerging markets. The Russian economy’s 
over-reliance on fossil fuels makes it vulnerable to fluctuations in oil and gas prices and the volatile 
energy prices have been a big problem. Russian FDI was halved in 2009 while the country’s GDP fell by 
8% (Barysch 2, 2010, p. 2). Despite the massive drop in demand for Russian gas in the EU during the 
first half of 2009, it was interpreted by Gazprom as validation of its policy of strict control (Baev & 
Øverland, 2010, p. 1080). Rather than loosening up and making it more appealing for the much needed 
Western capital and technology (Cameron, 2010, p. 26). 
As it was established earlier the Nabucco pipeline could lower the EU’s dependence on Russian gas 
and give Russia a smaller percentage of the European Union’s projected consumption increase. If that 
should happen Russia will have to look elsewhere to maintain their income from the gas trade that is 
so vital to the Russian economy. Therefore it is important to analyse Russia’s diversification options.  
In the east Moscow has looked to diversification options of its own and it could create a potential 
dilemma for the EU if Russia pursue those options and expand their trade eastwards. Russia might 
thus be less inclined to trade with Europe which would especially hurt those members that are over-
reliant on Russian gas. The most obvious alternative client to the EU-27 would be China. Not only is 
China an emerging economy with 1.6 billion people, but it also has an undersized energy sector that 
cannot provide for the growing energy consumption at its current production. Gerhard Schröder also 
expressed concerns over Russia’s diversification options as a threat the EU’s security of supply. 
Schröder who is now on Gazprom’s payroll as Chairman of the Shareholders’ Committee of Nord 
Stream AG said in 2009: "There is no reason to doubt the reliability of Russia as a partner. We must be a 
partner of Russia if we want to share in the vast raw material reserves in Siberia. The alternative for 
Russia would be to share these reserves with China." (Freifeld, 2009, p. 2). Russia has undeveloped fields 
in Siberia that could feed the neighbouring China and there have been talks between Russian President 
Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Hu Jintao about shipping as much as 68 bcm to China starting in 
2015. The importance of this move – that would make China the single biggest client of Gazprom- is 
not lost on the Russian government. As Russian deputy chief of staff, Yury Ushakov said in Moscow in 
Oct 2011: “China has become our first trade partner, bypassing Germany, and this is quite symbolic” 
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(Bloomberg News, 2011). Some of the gas would most likely be supplied via the proposed Altai gas 
pipeline which is scheduled to ship 30 bcm of gas from Western Siberia to North-Western China.  
This sounds promising but establishing those new fields in Siberia will be costly and they are not 
nearly the same size as the deposits in the Urals, Caucasus and in the Barents Basin. As shown in 
Figure 6-1 there is very little to be mined from the Eastern parts of Russia compared to the deposits in 
the west and building pipelines from the west of Russia all the way to China would be extremely 
expensive.  
 
FIGURE 6-1 PROVEN GAZPROM NATURAL RESERVES (GAZPROM, 2012) 
 
 
This is further complicated by the fact that China is unwilling or unable to pay the netback value prices 
that Russia gets from the EU (Bloomberg News, 2011). In the beginning of 2012 China signed a 65 bcm 
deal with Turkmenistan. This is seen by some as a power play by China who now possess leverage in 
any future negotiations with Russia (Petersen, 2012).  
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Last but not least, China is exploring the controversial shale gas and their demand for gas imports 
could therefore be on the decline as they are aiming towards mining as much as 60 bcm of shale gas by 
2020 (Walsh, 2012, p. 26). So even though Russia is planning to expand their exports into China they 
are highly unlikely to be able to establish a trade relationship that can even rival that of the EU as a 
customer. One thing is to establish goals another is to carry them out in practice. Roughly 90% of 
Russia’s energy products go westwards and the EU remains by far the largest and most profitable 
market (Barysch 2, 2010, p. 4). In the words of Fraser Cameron, director of the EU-Russia Centre:  
“TALK OF ALTERNATIVE PIPELINES TO CHINA IS JUST THAT – TALK.”  
(Cameron, 2010, p. 26). 
 
The list of potential suppliers to Nabucco is the second reason why Russia perceives the pipeline as a 
threat. Russia’s relationship with the countries that Nabucco views as potential suppliers will be 
examined and why it potentially can hurt Russia’s geo-political standing. 
The US, EU, Russia and China are amidst a ‘new great game’ in the heart of Central-Asia and energy is 
the focal point of this great power pursuit for influence in the region. Russia is struggling to regain 
influence in the remnants of its former empire while trying to secure its energy monopoly (Adolphsen, 
2006, pp. 80-83). Russia and China have so far been successful at pushing the US back in Central-Asia 
but the EU is making attempts at trading with Russia’s former allies at the expense of Russian exports. 
As part of its “European Neighbourhood Policy” the EU has shown increasing interest in the former 
USSR countries surrounding Russia (Barysch, 2010, p. 8). Furthermore the EU’s flagship pipeline 
project – Nabucco - has some of its intended destinations in the midst of this clash of great power 
interests. 
The potential suppliers to Nabucco mostly constitute nations that are countries to be in Russia’s 
sphere of influence. Countries like Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are all former parts of the USSR. 
Moscow believes these areas to be of special value to Russia and they seek a certain influence over 
these regions.  
Former Russian President Dmitri Medvedev held a speech in late-August of 2008 where he outlined 
five principles for his foreign policy as President. It has since been known as the “Medvedev Doctrine”. 
In the speech Medvedev clearly defined Russia’s view of foreign relations and mentioned that the 
country recognizes the supremacy of international law but also that a single polar world is 
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unacceptable. The fifth principle in his speech stated it quite clearly: “There are regions in which Russia 
has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical 
relations (...). We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with 
these countries, our close neighbours” (Friedman, 2008, p. 1). This implies that Russia sees itself as 
being part of a ‘society of states’. These states are not specified by name but it is fair to assume that the 
former USSR members – it’s near abroad - are those states whom Russia have “special historical 
relations”. Russia’s actions in its near surroundings though suggest more of an imperial setting where 
Moscow is positioned in the centre and its neighbours in the periphery (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 
434-37). The foreign policy of its neighbours seems of a major concern to Russia even to an extent 
where it justifies intervention, which clearly implies something less symbiotic than a ‘society of states’. 
The timing of this speech is also very telling. It was held in August 2008, weeks after the conclusion of 
the Russo-Georgian war. So even though the term “friendly ties” is used to describe the relationship 
with their neighbours this suggests that Russia is willing to use any means necessary if those 
neighbourly ties do not suffice to cement its position in the region (Christie, 2009, pp. 10-11).  It is also 
a signal to the rest of the world especially the West that it will not tolerate intrusions onto its domain.  
Russia’s relationship with the former USSR states surrounding the Caspian Sea has so far been very 
beneficial to Russia. Russia has bought up enormous quantities of gas from the Caspian Sea’s littoral 
states countries35. The gas from these countries has been bought cheap and sold on to the EU with a 
huge profit. Russia has already lost some of the leverage it had on the Caspian gas exports as it 
currently imports only 30 bcm36  from the former USSR states. Not only is this a loss of income for 
Gazprom and hence for the Russian state but it is a loss of influence in countries of strategic 
importance. Russia therefore feels threatened as the EU and Nabucco eyes Caspian gas as a new source 
of supply. Russia has previously been criticized for using its energy supplies to gain political influence 
(Ratner, Belkin, Nicol, & Woehrel, 2012, p. 3) and there is little indication that the current situation is 
any exception37. 
 
6.1.1 PART-CONCLUSION 
Russia’s economy is very dependent on its gas exports. It therefore has to fight the EU’s attempts at 
diversification; especially because Russia’s own diversification options are limited. Russia is in other 
                                                             
35 See subsection 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 for more on this 
36 This comes mainly from Kazakhstan (11.4 bcm) and Turkmenistan (10.1 bcm) (BP, 2012, p. 28). 
37 See section 6.4 “Russian Divide and Rule”. 
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words more dependent on the EU than vice versa. The EU’s diversification efforts are even more 
damaging to Russia as the potential suppliers to the Nabucco pipeline lie in countries that Moscow 
considers part of their sphere of influence. Russia hopes to establish a ‘society of states’ with these 
countries where common norms and values bring the states closer together. Situations like the Russia-
Georgia conflict and the Russia-Ukraine disputes on the other hand seem to indicate that this is not the 
case. 
 
6.2 GETTING POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS TO THE PIPELINE 
This section will focus on the potential suppliers to the Nabucco Project and their relevance for the 
project in general but it will look into episodes and/or circumstances involving these actors that might 
have deferred the project and so far kept the Nabucco consortium from signing enough suppliers to fill 
the 31 bcm of natural gas which is the pipeline’s annual capacity. 
The Nabucco consortium has looked mainly at the countries surrounding the Caspian Sea for a source 
of gas imports to their proposed pipeline, but also certain countries in the Middle East have been on 
the table. So far the project has failed to secure a single binding contract and the following will 
examine some of the reasons why.  
 
6.2.1 IRAQ AND IRAN 
South of the planned pipeline route into Turkey only Iraq and Iran appear as supply options for 
Nabucco. The availability and political obstacles for these two potential suppliers will be examined in 
this section. Other Middle Eastern countries with a gas capacity such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the 
United Arab Emirates are excluded from this section. It is deemed an unlikely scenario that they 
should provide piped gas to Nabucco although large quantities of LNG from Qatar are reaching the 
European market presently.  
Ironically the war-torn Iraq might be one of the safest investments for the Nabucco Project (Turunc, 
2011, pp. 42-43). At least that is true from an infrastructure perspective. Iraq has reserves of an 
estimated 3600 bcm of natural gas and it is only extracting a small fraction of this,38 meaning that 
there is an untapped supply that Nabucco could benefit from. Secondly, Iraq is already exporting oil to 
                                                             
38 Iraq produced 1.9 bcm in 2010. Around 0.05% of their reserves (BP, 2012, pp. 20-22) 
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Turkey and the pipeline infrastructure between Iraq and Turkey could also be expanded to supply gas 
along the same route.  Mining the gas and supplying it to Europe would therefore be relatively cost 
efficient (Barysch, 2010, p. 13). It must however be considered highly problematic that the gas 
reserves are mainly located in the Kurdish region of Iraq - an autonomous region. The Iraqi 
constitution of 2005 formally recognizes the region of Kurdistan (The Associated Press, 2005), but 
there is still tension between the Kurdish regional government and the Iraqi central government. The 
Iraqi government have so far been unable to agree with the Kurdish region on who should profit from 
any potential gas trade with the EU. Kurdish authorities might be willing to export gas without the 
consent of Baghdad, but that solution would hardly be acceptable to the EU. Such an agreement would 
undermine the Iraqi government’s legitimacy and thus strain the US-EU relationship.  The Turkish 
government is unlikely to accept such a scenario either, as it might strengthen the Kurdish separatists 
in south-eastern Turkey (Barysch, 2010, p. 13). Iraq still remains a possible supplier but it must settle 
its internal disputes with the Kurdish minority before any trade with the Nabucco consortium can 
proceed. Iraq, even if it can position itself as a supplier to Nabucco it is unable to supply enough gas to 
fill the pipe on its own. Iraq has struggled to return to the 3 bcm per year they produced before the US-
Iraq war in 2003 (BP, 2012, p. 22). A best case scenario for Iraq in regards to Nabucco would most 
likely be as supporting contributor. 
Iran is at first glance a prime candidate to supply gas to Europe first and foremost because of its vast 
gas reserves. It has the second-largest reserves of natural gas in the world with 33,000 bcm - or 
around 15.9% of global reserves (BP, 2012, p. 20). Secondly, Iran only produced 151.8 bcm in 2011 
(BP, 2012, p. 22) and at current production Iran has enough gas to last another 200 years so there is 
ample room for further extraction. The Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki speaking in 
2009 at an energy commission meeting between Iran and the United Arab Emirates also went as far as 
saying “Speaking about the Nabucco pipeline without Iran’s participation would amount to nothing but a 
pipeline void of gas” (Chossudovsky, 2010).  Iran was originally envisaged for Nabucco by Austrian and 
Turkish businessmen before politics intervened. As previously mentioned in section 5.2.1 “Security of 
Supply for the EU” there was originally scheduled to be a third leg of the pipeline splitting off from 
Ahiboz, Turkey into Iran but this idea has been scrapped. Political friction over the Islamic Republics 
controversial nuclear program and intensifying US and EU sanctions (Nasseri, 2012) is the main 
reason why Iran is not a potential supplier to the Nabucco Project. 
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6.2.2 THE TROUBLES WITH THE CASPIAN SEA AND ITS LITTORAL STATES 
 The Caspian region is currently of the utmost importance to the Nabucco Project as the Nabucco 
consortium will need to agree with countries like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to make the pipeline 
viable. The northern leg of the Nabucco pipeline is scheduled to run from Turkey into Georgia and 
from there into Azerbaijan. That would potentially give Nabucco access to some of the untapped 
reservoirs of gas in the Caspian Sea’s littoral states which could become a necessity for Nabucco seeing 
as the Middle East is highly unlikely to 
procure the 31 bcm that it is striving for.  
The Caspian Sea however presents a 
unique legal problem since it is not 
technically a Sea but a lake. The articles of 
United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS39) 
clearly stipulate the division of oceans but 
there is no clear definition for lakes which 
makes the Caspian troublesome. Agreeing 
on the rights to the Caspian is a debate that 
has been going on since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.  
During the 20th century the Caspian Sea 
was shared by the USSR and Persia40. 
Treaties signed in 1921 and 1940 declared the Caspian as a lake and called for a joint utilization of the 
waters. The treaties were formulated well before anyone knew that the depths contained riches in the 
form of oil and gas deposits. The old Soviet-Persian treaty of sharing the Caspian Sea was still being 
utilised by both Russia and Iran after the massive geopolitical changes in the wake of the end of the 
Cold War but the newly independent states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan rejected this 
treaty as not being legally binding (Zimnitskaya & von Geldern, 2011, pp. 4-6). Iran has declared that 
the dissolution of the USSR does not make the Caspian a res nullius41 and that Russia must devise a 
mechanism to share its side of the Caspian Sea with the other CIS countries. Russia’s proposals have so 
far been rejected by Iran. Russia has instead made a trilateral agreement with neighbouring Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan using a median line principle (Zimnitskaya & von Geldern, 2011, p. 10). So despite the 
                                                             
39 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations, 1982) 
40 The country wasn’t officially named “Iran” until after the Islamic revolution in 1979  
41 ”an object of law belonging to no state and thus open to unilateral appropriation or occupation by the first 
comer or taker” (Zimnitskaya & von Geldern, 2011, p. 6) 
 59 Analysis of the factors that are delaying the Nabucco Project 
required agreement of all five littoral states to install a common legal regime the Russian median line 
principle is de facto installed and applied in the upper half of the Caspian Sea, much to the chagrin of 
Iran. But unless all five states agree it may hard to complete the proposed Trans-Caspian pipeline42 
from Türkmenbaşy, Turkmenistan to Baku, Azerbaijan and supply Nabucco with Turkmen gas. Both 
Russia and Iran have previously condemned the plans for this pipeline, arguing that it could pose an 
environmental threat. An agreement is looking highly unlikely since both Iran and especially Russia 
stand to lose both financially as well as politically by its completion.   
 
6.2.3 AZERBAIJAN’S ROLE IN THE NABUCCO PROJECT 
For the Nabucco Project Azerbaijan is simply put the gateway to the Caspian Sea, as any Western 
pipeline predicted to cross the body of water must pass through here. Russia and Iran represents 
obvious a political and geographical barriers to the north and south. Azerbaijan only has proven 
reserves of about 1300 bcm and a production of around 15 bcm annually and even though the country 
only became a net exporter of gas in 2007 (Giuli, 2008, p. 4), experts believe that they possess the most 
readily available sources of gas to Nabucco (Barysch, 2010, p. 10). The off-shore Shah Deniz and Shah 
Deniz II gas fields retain great potential. The country is therefore essential if any talks about trade with 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and/or Uzbekistan are to be realized. Shah Deniz, which is placed just off 
the coast of Azerbaijan, was commissioned in 2006 and it has been delivering 6 bcm to Turkey every 
year through the South Caspian Pipeline. The Azerbaijani state energy company SOCAR43 has joined up 
with BP and Statoil to expand the activities in the gas field (Barysch, 2010, p. 10). The debate over the 
Caspian Sea has been vital to Azerbaijan as they have wanted mining rights to the huge Shaz Deniz 
fields just off their coast. The trilateral agreements with Russia and Kazakhstan have been very 
important as it has allowed Azerbaijan to commence mining in their waters without antagonizing 
Russia and for that matter Kazakhstan. However the tense disagreement between Iran and Azerbaijan 
remains (Kucera, 2011). Turkey and Azerbaijan are experiencing bilateral disputes mainly about 
tangible issues such as gas prices and transit fees. But the underlying political dispute stems from a 
disagreement over Armenia. Turkey and Armenia have been reconciling their historical disputes 
originating from an alleged genocide committed by the Ottoman Empire, on Armenians settled in 
turkey during the First World War. This has infuriated Baku as Azerbaijan has an on-going dispute 
with Armenia over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey has backed down from normalizing 
their relationship with Armenia but Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev still has not allowed SOCAR to 
                                                             
42 The Trans-Caspian Pipeline Project (UPI, 2012) 
43 State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic 
 60 Analysis of the factors that are delaying the Nabucco Project 
negotiate with Turkey and thus Nabucco over Shah Deniz II (Barysch, 2010, pp. 10-11).  Despite the 
developments in Shah Deniz there are still problems for Azerbaijan and thus for Nabucco. Though the 
Trans-Caspian pipeline seems to be moving in the right direction, negotiations are taking time and 
Nabucco’s investors are getting anxious. The second stage of the Shah Deniz field – also known as Shah 
Deniz II - was supposed to yield between 8-12 bcm by 2013 which looks highly unlikely but recent 
developments in April 2012 gave hope for a resolution. According to a press release from BP, the Shah 
Deniz II field has entered the so-called “FEED44 stage” and could be ready to produce in 2017 (Bayatly, 
2012). This is potentially very good news for Nabucco as gas from Shah Deniz II is expected to be 
exported to Europe but investors have experienced Azerbaijan’s lacking ability to live up to its 
promises before. Azerbaijan is deemed by several experts to be the key to Nabucco. Without 
Azerbaijan there simply won’t be a pipeline. At least around 8 bcm from Azerbaijan is needed for the 
pipeline project to get started. This would only be around 25% of capacity, but would ensure investors 
that the project is actually getting built (Freifeld, 2009, p. 7). Secondly, Azerbaijan is the only access 
point to the eastern part of the Caspian. Though Azerbaijan can supply the first 8 bcm needed to get 
Nabucco started, other markets like Turkmenistan will most likely be needed if the pipeline is to reach 
its full capacity (Barysch, 2010, p. 11). 
 
6.2.4 TURKMENISTAN’S POSSIBLE ROLE IN THE NABUCCO PROJECT 
 In order to weigh Turkmenistan’s potential to Nabucco it is necessary to evaluate the country’s role as 
a gas producer. Turkmenistan is presently an 
aggressively wooed nation. It has massive gas 
reserves which are being courted by Russia, 
China, Iran and the EU and even more gas has 
been discovered within the last year. BP’s 
renowned yearly report “Statistical Review of 
World Energy” puts Turkmenistan’s gas proven 
reserves at 24,300 bcm in their June 2012 edition 
(BP, 2012, p. 20). This is nearly twice the amount 
Turkmenistan was estimated to have last year 
(BP, 2011, p. 20) and thus makes the country 
even more attractive to gas importers.  
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Turkmenistan had seemingly been the odd man out for many years. They had not participated actively 
in negotiations on how to divide the Caspian Sea in the past, either out of disregard or part of a foreign 
policy strategy. Turkmenistan has until recently not appeared to have any interest in being involved in 
pipeline politics. They have simply preferred to sell its gas at the border and leave it up to the potential 
buyer to lay the pipe needed for further transport of the gas (Barysch, 2010, p. 12). Russia has 
historically bought up practically all of Turkmenistan’s natural gas. Russia and Turkmenistan signed a 
25-year trade deal of up to 80 bcm per year in 2003 (Yilmaz, 2012) though only around 60 bcm was 
sent annually. This agreement was set at the lower “cost-plus” pricing (see Error! Reference source 
not found.) and benefitted Russia as they could ship the gas off to Europe for a hefty profit. This also 
partially benefitted Turkmenistan as it gave them an easy, steady income but on the other hand it also 
left them totally dependent on Russia. The Turkmen president Saparmurat Niyazov was a leftover 
from the Cold War and endorsed the close ties with Russia. International Society Theory would 
suggests that they shared the same history and ideas and thus to a degree could accept each other’s 
predicaments. An isolated Turkmenistan closely related to a weak Russia pressured by Western 
institutions. The situation changed however with the death of Niyazov in 2006. The new President 
Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov is more focused on expanding gas production and lowering the 
dependence on Russia. As one Turkmen official has pronounced: “freedom is multiple pipelines” 
(Barysch, 2010, p. 8). After Turkmenistan developed their alternative export options Russia was 
pressured to buy Turkmen gas using the higher “netback pricing” (see Error! Reference source not 
found.) that Russia otherwise receives when exporting to the EU, thus cancelling its profits from 
resale (Konoplyanik, 2010). But since this is the same pricing that the EU uses to pay for its imports 
Russia thus diminished the advantage the EU otherwise had in dealing with Turkmenistan. 
Turkmenistan now receives the same compensation for its gas that it would if it was piped to the EU. 
Considering that Gazprom has become Russia’s biggest debtor due to the financial crisis (Freifeld, 
2009, p. 8) this can be seen as a desperate measure by Gazprom to discourage further development on 
the Nabucco Project. But it can just as likely be perceived as part of Moscow’s broader geopolitical 
strategy to control the Central-Asian energy flow to Europe and thereby ensuring an EU that must 
accept Russia’s claims to full control of its near abroad.  
Nonetheless shortly after Moscow and Ashgabat agreed to the terms for the new netback pricing a 
pipeline between Russia and Turkmenistan exploded. Turkmenistan blamed Russia for the explosion 
that seemed very convenient for Moscow. The gas trade between the two nations was halted for a year 
but resumed in 2010 (Vershinin, 2010). Russia has since then only bought a fraction of the agreed 
amount (BP, 2012, p. 28). 
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With Russia not fulfilling its import quota Turkmenistan was looking for new partners such as the EU. 
Nabucco and Turkmenistan looked like a potential match as the decline in trade with Russia had left 
Turkmenistan with ample gas to fill the Nabucco Pipeline’s needs. But despite exploration efforts by 
Germany’s RWE and Austria’s OMV – which are both members of the Nabucco consortium – there has 
been no clarification on the Caspian Sea dispute. In December 2011 the Russian president at the time – 
Dmitry Medvedev – offered Berdymukhamedov to buy 80 bcm from Turkmenistan per year. This was 
a desperate effort to halt the construction of the Trans-Caspian Pipeline and steer Turkmenistan away 
from Europe (Coyle, 2012). No deal was agreed upon and China seized the opportunity and offered the 
regime in Ashgabat to purchase 65 bcm yearly and make all the necessary arrangements for 
transporting the gas. In January 2012 the deal was signed and a pipeline through Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan now delivers the gas to north-western China (as mentioned in section 6.1). Turkmenistan’s 
new massive gas trade with China leaves the Nabucco project less sought-after by Ashgabat.  
Ashgabat also have to worry about drawing Moscow’s ire by shunning Russian trade in favour of the 
EU. In the words of Alexander Rahr of the German Council on Foreign Relations “…if Turkmenistan 
were to lay out the pipeline a conflict might break out” (Coyle, 2012). A few years ago this would have 
been an absurd postulation but the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 changed this view. The war was a 
chilling display of Russia’s reluctance to sit idly by as the West made allies of parts of the former USSR. 
The open hostilities were a clear signal to the CIS and there is no telling if Moscow would be willing to 
resort to such measures again. In case of war Turkmenistan is probably unlikely to receive even the 
small support that Georgia received in 2008 since it is not a close affiliate to either the EU or the US. 
But so far Berdymukhamedov seems undeterred in his efforts to export Turkmenistan’s gas to the 
highest bidder.  
 Turkmenistan is an intriguing prospect to the Nabucco pipeline. Though Turkmenistan is 
approximately 3000 km from Bulgaria – the closest EU member – the country also holds such a 
tantalizingly ample supply of natural gas that a trade agreement with Turkmenistan would all but 
secure the capacity of Nabucco. Furthermore if the Nabucco Project is able to arrange a connection to 
Turkmenistan it then opens up the option of trading with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as well. But 
crossing the Caspian has little chance of success and with Turkmenistan’s new megadeal with China it 
is questionable if they can even deliver to Nabucco. 
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6.2.5 PART-CONCLUSION 
It is preferable to deal with or obtain trade linkages with likeminded regimes and statespeople. As 
prescribed in International Society Theory it would possibly ensure that a common understanding 
could be obtained as the human actors would consider the same concerns relevant. This is however 
highly unlikely to occur in the Caspian and Middle Eastern region from an EU perspective. The regimes 
of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and even the fragile attempt at a democratic institution in Iraq offer little 
insurance of upholding international law and honouring human rights. Politicians in the EU member 
states must thus juggle with their national, international and humanitarian responsibilities in regards 
to obtaining natural gas from this region. Hydrocarbon resources can be considered vital for a modern 
state’s socio-economic sustainability. The necessity for gas in large quantities can also be considered a 
traditional security issue and thus clearly becomes a national responsibility for statespeople to ensure. 
The member states supporting Nabucco as well as the Commission are working towards obtaining 
legally binding gas contracts with the possible suppliers in the hope of securing further progress of the 
project.  
The ‘anarchical society’ suggests that some common rules are in place and it is via those that the five 
littoral states have tried to agree on a common legal regime for the Caspian Sea – albeit unsuccessfully. 
It appears that the littoral states have for the most part interacted regularly and thus reached an 
influence level where one state has impact on another’s decisions. In this ‘system of states’ calculation 
of other states’ behaviour becomes a necessity. The mistrust in the region and lack of acceptance of 
other states’ needs are likely the main reason why the Caspian Sea has not been divided. Russia 
appears to abide by regional inter-state law when it prohibits the Trans-Caspian pipeline from being 
built as no conclusive arrangement has been made. However Russia simultaneously ignores these 
same rules when it established the trilateral legal regime in the north of the Caspian Sea without the 
consent of all the littoral states. Russian breach of the ‘right of non-intervention’ in Georgia sent a 
signal to its near-abroad. The Medvedev doctrine further enables Russia to enact a form of “legal” 
aggression in Turkmenistan if a gas feeder to Nabucco should somehow cross the Caspian Sea. 
Azerbaijan and its gas reserves are considered the key to Nabucco or at least to its inauguration. It 
appears to be obtainable as both Azerbaijan and several EU members have a common interest in 
lessening their dependence on Russia. 
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6.3 THE INTERNAL DISPUTE IN THE EU 
This section will look into the different national interests between the member states of the European 
Union and how these have shaped the often inconsistent foreign policy of the EU and possibly stalled 
the Nabucco Project’s development.  
When looking at the European Union as a foreign policy actor it has tremendous potential as an 
economic power. The European Union is comprised of 27 sovereign nations including some of the 
wealthiest in the world. Was it truly one state – an actual “United States of Europe” it would be the 
richest in the world measured by GDP (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011) narrowly ahead of the US. 
The EU is of course not one nation and therefore cannot act as one albeit it shows state-like behaviour 
on occasion. The 27 member states have to consider individual national interests as these still 
supersede the interests of the collected Union and as such the Commission. This is a major factor when 
discussing what has prevented the Nabucco Project from reaching an actual construction phase.  
Turkey’s ambassador to the United States blatantly called the EU itself “the biggest impediment to 
progress on Nabucco’s development.” (Freifeld, 2009, p. 6). Although Turkey is not an EU member it is 
part of the of the Nabucco consortium through its state-owned energy giant Botas. Turkey’s geo-
political standing in regards to Nabucco suggests that it has everything to win by its completion. So the 
statement from the Turkish official does carry some weight in examining why Nabucco is still in the 
development phase, considering that Turkey has urged the project forward from the beginning. The 
division in Europe must be considered a serious impediment for the project.  
 
6.3.1 AN EAST-WEST DIVIDE IN THE EU 
This section will look at certain key players in the Nabucco debate and what their relationship is with 
Russia. In regards to Nabucco the EU is split into two groups; those who believe the project is vital for 
Europe’s energy security and those who think of it as an expensive, unnecessary solution to a non-
existent problem.  
With a few exceptions the division in the EU is a split between its newest members in the Eastern part 
and the so called ‘old Europe’ in the Western part. Eastern Europe’s over-dependence on Russian gas 
was examined in chapter 5. Here it was shown that states such as Slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Poland currently rely on Russia for most of – if not all of - their annual gas consumption (BP, 2011, p. 
29). The prospect of being without access to this gas even for a brief period can have a devastating 
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effect as was experienced during the supply cut-offs in 2006 and 2009. The eastern member states 
have not implemented sufficient diversification, their emergency plans are under-developed and they 
greatly desire to lessen the dependence on Russian gas which to them makes Nabucco an enticing 
prospect. The western members on the other hand are mostly well-diversified and have solid 
emergency plans linked to big storage tanks that can be relied on if one supplier should fail to deliver. 
The Nabucco Project therefore is more of an added import option to most of these states than an actual 
necessity.  
The Eastern Europeans have accused the leading EU countries of adopting an “every man for himself”-
approach to energy that is damaging to the newest members not to mention the EU as a whole. They 
believe that the Western part has also adopted a ‘don’t rile the Bear’-strategy towards Russia in an 
effort to maintain their good relations and avoid supply complications (Barysch, 2010, pp. 6-7). The 
Western European members are mostly of the opinion that the newer Eastern European members  
have done too little to diversify by not building interconnectors etc. and that it is mainly up to each 
member  to maintain security of supply (Barysch, 2010, pp. 7-8).  
 
6.3.1.1 GERMANY 
Germany is the nation in the EU with the best energy relationship with Russia (Whist, 2010, p. 175). 
Germany receives over 30 bcm per year from Russia (BP, 2012, p. 28)which makes it Russia’s biggest 
client in the EU. Germany also benefits greatly from the Nord Stream pipeline45 that runs from Russia 
through the Baltic Sea and Danish waters directly into northern Germany. A huge scandal erupted in 
Germany when Gerhard Schröder with his close ties to Putin and Russia went from being Chancellor to 
that of an employ of Gazprom as chairman of the Nord Stream project (Freifeld, 2009, pp. 1-2). The 
favourable relationship with Russia has also meant that Germany has not historically been the 
warmest supporter of diversification via Nabucco. German Chancellor Angela Merkel initially vetoed 
the €200 million feasibility study grant that the EU proposed in 2003. The Chancellor eventually did 
change her stance but not until the EU agreed to support Nord Stream (Barysch, 2010, p. 5).  
Though Germany’s state leaders are not firm believers of Nabucco, Germany’s major energy company 
RWE is a consortium member of Nabucco and therefore could stand to gain if Nabucco materialises. 
Moreover RWE has started a study for the Trans Caspian pipeline together with OMV (Turkish Weekly, 
2011). But RWE has recently been contemplating opting out of Nabucco (Reuters, 2012) seemingly 
                                                             
45 Nord Stream will be covered in subsection 6.4.2 
 66 Analysis of the factors that are delaying the Nabucco Project 
due to the significant cost of the project so all-in-all Germany seems less than enthusiastic about 
Nabucco. 
6.3.1.2 ITALY 
Italy is another of the large EU countries on good terms with Russia. Italy receives around 15 bcm from 
Russia annually which is substantial but only amount to around 20% of its total consumption and it’s 
less than the 21 bcm it imports from Algeria. Much has been made of former Italian Prime Minister 
Silvio Berlusconi’s relationship with Russia’s Vladimir Putin and it is believed that Berlusconi 
prioritised bilateral agreements with Putin (Barysch, 2010, p. 6). Berlusconi has spoken very 
favourably of Russia, saying “I think we can consider ourselves lucky to receive energy resources from 
Russia, a friendly country that never violates its commitments.” (South Stream Transport AG, 2009). 
There have also been allegations posted by the “whistle blower” website Wikileaks that Putin 
promised Berlusconi a bribe for signing an energy 
deal between the two countries (Evans, Harding, & 
Hooper, 2010). Berlusconi was voted out of office in 
2011 and it is yet to be seen whether the change to 
the incumbent Prime Minister Mario Monti will alter 
Italy’s energy strategy. The personal bond between 
Italian and Russian leaders might not exist presently 
but the national responsibility of Italian officials to 
secure its gas imports will most likely outweigh any 
other concerns about Russia (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, pp. 146-48). 
Italy still maintains a strong bond with Russia since the Italian energy company ENI is Gazprom’s main 
partner in the South Stream Project46 and Italy is scheduled to become one of the two destination 
points for South Stream, with Germany being the other (Barysch, 2010, p. 6). ENI has obviously not 
supported Nabucco but they recently suggested a merger of South Stream and Nabucco. Gazprom 
however quickly denied this would be an option (Barysch, 2010, p. 16).  
 
6.3.1.3 FRANCE  
France only receives 8.6 bcm  - or roughly 20% of their consumption - from Russia (BP, 2012, p. 28) 
and they are well diversified on other sources (Freifeld, 2009, p. 4). France’s stance on Nabucco is very 
influenced by its relationship to the Nabucco consortium member Turkey. French energy giant Gaz de 
                                                             
46 South Stream will be covered in subsection 6.4.3 
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France were in talks to join Nabucco in 2007 and 2008 but were vetoed by Turkey (Socor, 2009). 
Turkey’s dispute with France stems from France’s position over an alleged Ottoman genocide on 
Armenians. France’s parliament made it a crime to deny the Ottoman murder of Armenian civilians in 
1915. The decision have incensed Turkish politicians to a point where they don’t want a French 
company to become a part of the Nabucco consortium, even though a major EU country such as France 
could tip the balance in the EU towards a more pro-Nabucco setting. Former French President 
Nicholas Sarkozy later on expressed an interest in joining Gazprom’s competing South Stream Project.  
Some observers though still perceive that a French company will join Nabucco sooner or later 
(Barysch, 2010, pp. 5-6). Despite Turkey’s statement other Consortium members have expressed their 
opinion hinting to the fact that Nabucco is an EU project and all EU members should be a welcome 
addition.  
 
6.3.1.4 UNITED KINGDOM 
The United Kingdom (UK) is one outlier as it is a Western EU member that supports Nabucco. It is also 
the only major EU state to do so (Barysch, 2010, p. 6). The UK’s geographical placement puts it in a 
position where it can afford to oppose Russia more openly as it receives most of its imports from 
Norway by pipeline and from Qatar by LNG while it imports no gas from Russia (BP, 2012, p. 28).  
The UK relies on the North Sea deposits and increasing LNG capacity which is satisfactory for the near 
future but the UK knows that more pipeline gas will be needed eventually. The “Southern Corridor” 
provides such an opportunity as well as it enhances the overall geopolitical position of the EU which 
would be welcomed in London  (Barysch, 2010, p. 6). It could naturally be argued that exactly because 
it has no dependence on Russian energy deliveries the UK is in a better position to openly support the 
Nabucco Project. That said the UK have had diplomatic clashes with Russia in the past most 
notoriously over the Russian dissident Alexander Litvinenko who was killed in a hospital in London 
allegedly by orders from the Russian state  (Harding, 2011). Whether that particular situation would 
have turned out differently if Russia had been essential to UK’s energy security is hard to answer but 
the UK’s classical atlanticist approach most likely is the reason why the Nabucco Project in particular 
favours their attention. UK Prime Minister David Cameron has publicly stressed the importance of 
European gas supply diversification and supported Caspian gas projects , essentially urging the EU to 
lessen their dependency on Russian gas (Socor, 2012).  
Though the UK doesn’t support the Nabucco Project in practice it remains its strongest supporter by 
far of the western members. London views the potential for gas diversification via the ‘Southern 
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Corridor’ and through the Commissions flagship project Nabucco as an asset for the EU with possible 
geopolitical benefits (Barysch, 2010, p. 6). 
 
6.3.1.5 POLAND AND THE EASTERN PART OF THE EU 
Poland is the largest Eastern EU country and a staunch supporter of Nabucco (Baev & Øverland, 2010, 
pp. 1076-77). As a former eastern bloc country and one that is overly dependent on Russian gas 
supplies Poland essentially represents the Eastern EU on the matter of diversification. Poland receives 
over 60% of its gas from Russia and they angrily opposed Nord Stream as it bypassed them and 
removed their relevance as a transit country from the East to West (Barysch, 2010, p. 5). The Polish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radoslaw Sikorski, even went as far as naming Nord Stream “the Molotov-
Ribbentrop pipeline” (Whist, 2010, p. 168). Though the sentiment was not voiced as strongly by other 
Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary and Slovakia they are excessively 
dependent on Russian imports and they were startled by the Ukraine-Russo gas dispute as it left 
millions of their citizens freezing. These countries cannot afford to rely on just one supplier and for 
them Nabucco is the best option to change an unfavourable status quo (Barysch, 2010, p. 6). Common 
interests understood as import-export of gas between Eastern European members and Russia is in 
most cases not enough to alleviate the concerns of over-dependence. It can possibly be argued that 
there is an absence of common interests as there is little emphasis on political conciliation particularly 
between Warsaw and Moscow. In that case institutions are of little avail. It would explain the 
apprehensive and even fearful atmosphere between the actors (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 118). The 
lack of common interests would suggest that relative gains are the measurement between these states. 
The Nabucco Project’s aim at circumventing Russia and its planned route of crossing directly through 
several Eastern European member states thus has a natural appeal to Warsaw, Prague and others with 
a conflictual relationship with Moscow.  
 
6.3.2 ENERGY SECURITY VERSUS ENERGY SOLIDARITY 
The following section emphasises the challenge each member state faces in obtaining a steady and 
stable supply of energy preferably by various energy sources as well as destinations of import origin. 
History, national availability, proximity to nearby sources, foreign policy and economy all adds to the 
present energy situation as well as affects national decisions regarding diversification such as the 
Nabucco Project (Baev & Øverland, 2010, p. 1079). The section will discuss the relevance of solidarity 
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in energy-related issues in the EU and/or the lack thereof.  What that means and which consequences 
it might have in regards to the energy relationship with Russia as well as for the Nabucco Project. 
Energy security - defined as “the availability of sufficient supplies at affordable prices” (Yergin, 2006) - 
is of the utmost importance to the modern state and in the EU there are varying ways of ensuring 
energy security and the view on what typifies threats to energy security is not necessarily shared 
between the EU members. Especially since relationships with Russia vary between Eastern Europe 
and Western Europe. When it comes to energy security the tendency is for the individual member 
state to act on behalf rather than in the interest of the collective good of the EU. 
Germany, Italy, France and the UK all have a fairly secure and diverse supply of gas but only the UK is 
totally independent of Russian gas. It is likely the reason why the UK it is the only larger member state 
to support the Nabucco Project. On the other hand Poland and most of Eastern Europe which is highly 
dependent on Russian gas support the project. It suggests that Germany, Italy and France prefer status 
quo as their respective national interests are secured. Further cooperation with Russia is seemingly 
the goal for these states as opposed to less which is advocated by other European countries. The UK 
shares the United States’ preference of lessening the reliance of Russian hydrocarbons to the EU - if 
possible to mitigate or remove any leverage posed by this foreign power in matters relating to 
security. But the notion of a classical security threat bears little weight in a community of states mostly 
concerned with price fluctuations – obtaining cheap gas with limited scepticism of the supplier. That 
said companies in the EU to a large degree diversify their gas imports, though with various success, 
depending on the particular member-state but simultaneously take advantage of Russia’s near 
proximity.  
It might be considered alarming that especially Germany and Austria have begun concealing part of 
the monetary value of gas imports via their national statistical offices in regards to country of origin in 
international trade data. It is the norm in the EU to release much more inclusive data but many EU 
member states – especially Germany and Austria - have listed ‘unallocated’ destination of import on 
natural gas in more cases than any other members in Eurostat trade statistics. As economist Edward 
Christie argues a more transparent data on import price and destination country would be able to 
benefit European energy companies in a collective sense albeit not separately (Christie, 2009, p. 13).  
The supporters of Nabucco argue that diversifying the gas supplies of the collective European Union 
would be an advantage to all. The major powers in general see little need for diversifying away from 
Russian supplies and they are reluctant to antagonize Moscow by importing gas from former USSR 
states (Freifeld, 2009, p. 3) even if it would help some of the smaller EU members to the east. States 
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like Germany, France and Italy have a strong mercantile relationship with Russia and see no particular 
reason to change the situation.  
 
6.3.3 THE EU’S ENERGY POLICY  
European energy policy has become a struggle of conflicting interests between the EU Commission, the 
national governments of member states and energy companies. The energy policy efforts get caught on 
the difference between the short-term needs of nation states and their companies and the long-term 
needs of the union (Barysch, 2011, p. 1). 
 “Energy solidarity” has long been a debated issue in the EU. The lack of solidarity on energy policy 
between the member states goes against the vision of the European Commission and could be 
considered ironic considering the fact that the European Union started as an energy trade agreement 
under the name “European Coal and Steel Community”. In fact it was not until the Lisbon Treaty from 
late 2009 that the EU really had competence in the area of energy policy (Barysch, 2011, pp. 1-2) and 
article 194 in the Lisbon Treaty underlines the need for energy solidarity. The Lisbon Treaty’s article 
194, 1. -states as follow: 
“IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT AND FUNCTIONING OF THE 
INTERNAL MARKET AND WITH REGARD FOR THE NEED TO PRESERVE 
AND IMPROVE THE ENVIRONMENT, UNION POLICY ON ENERGY SHALL 
AIM, IN A SPIRIT OF SOLIDARITY BETWEEN MEMBER STATES, TO: 
(A) ENSURE THE FUNCTIONING OF THE ENERGY MARKET; 
(B) ENSURE SECURITY OF ENERGY SUPPLY IN THE UNION; 
(C) PROMOTE ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND ENERGY SAVING AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF NEW AND RENEWABLE FORMS OF ENERGY; AND 
(D) PROMOTE THE INTERCONNECTION OF ENERGY NETWORKS.” 
(The European Union, 2008/C 115/01) 
Especially 194,1. (b) is of interest here. The Lisbon Treaty clearly states that it is the obligation of 
Union members to ensure the security of energy supply in a “spirit of solidarity”.  The message is made 
even clearer in the EU Commission’s “ Second Strategic Energy Review – An EU Energy Security and 
Solidarity Action Plan” (Commission of the European Communities, 2008). Here the need for energy 
solidarity is a focal point and is seen as an intricate part of the internal market. It does however also 
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underline the basic premise that each member state is expected to take care of its own energy security 
and ensure a sufficient supply for themselves: “While each Member State is responsible for its own 
security, solidarity between Member States is a basic feature of EU membership” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2008, p. 3). The report is yet another attempt at creating a unifying energy 
policy for the EU.  
There have been many attempts at creating a common energy policy for the Union. But the focus has 
mainly been on lowering Europe’s CO2-emissions and much has happened in the last few years. In 
2007 the EU Council agreed upon the ambitious Energy Action Plan which carried the “20-20-20”-
plan47 with it.  (Umbach, 2010, p. 1235). There have also been constructive talks of diversifying and 
liberalizing the energy market internally (Baev & Øverland, 2010, p. 1080) but when external security 
of supply is discussed the heads of member states have failed to agree upon a common strategy 
towards Russia (Umbach, 2010, p. 1237). 
The contradiction poses a dilemma for EU member states. On the one hand the EU treaty and the 
Commission call for EU members to work together on energy security while on the other hand they 
also emphasize the individual state’s obligation to ensure their own energy supply. This leaves state 
leaders with a situation where they are recommended to act in the interests of the common EU but 
simultaneously has the sole responsibly for their own nation’s energy security  
 The argument for diversifying would be that even though Nabucco would only cover a very small 
percentage of the EU’s total gas consumption48 and even if Russia has generally been a stable supplier 
the availability of alternatives sources of gas would strengthen the European energy companies’ 
bargaining position with Russia. There is also an argument for building gas interconnectors internally 
in Europe and thus connecting Eastern Europe with the rest of the Union. Nabucco could be a part of 
this plan as it can reverse its flow and thus send gas from Austria to countries like Hungary and 
Bulgaria if need be (Barysch, 2010, p. 7). There are certainly many valid arguments for improvements 
via cooperation in any field formerly reserved for the individual state. But that does not remove the 
possible risks either. So unless the EU literally becomes one actor it will - despite the impressive 
advancements for closer cooperation - still have a core of 27 independent states. Taking the tradition 
for national energy policies in the EU into account as well as the lack of a proper common energy 
policy it is hard to knock Germany and Italy amongst others for prioritising bilateral agreements over 
to secure their national energy security. The decision to do so is however at the expense of Nabucco 
                                                             
47 The EU’s plan to cut CO2-emissions and increase energy efficiency by 20% before 2020 (Umbach, 2010, p. 
1235) 
48 31 bcm in contrast to the EU’s total consumption of around 450 bcm (BP, 2012, p. 23) 
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and the smaller member states of the EU and it is undermining the credibility of the Commission and 
current attempts at a common energy policy (Umbach, 2010, p. 1237). 
 
6.3.4 PART-CONCLUSION 
The Nabucco Pipeline has secured most of its funding (Natural Gas Europe, 2011)and the 
intergovernmental agreements have been signed but the issue of financing is still not entirely 
completed and the suppliers are hard to enlist. A joint EU behind the Nabucco Project most likely 
would make funding of the pipeline easier. The European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) would perceive the risk as lower and therefore be 
more likely to grant the necessary loans  (Barysch, 2010, p. 5). In addition to this a unified EU behind 
Nabucco would probably also make it easier to persuade the potential suppliers around the Caspian 
Sea and Iraq to sign the necessary contracts. The lack of unified support from the member states has 
clearly stalled the Nabucco Project – especially since the preponderance of the larger more influential 
members continue to hesitate with their support. Personal political ties appear to have or at least have 
had an influence on energy related foreign policy choices. Schröder and Berlusconi of respectively 
Germany and Italy to name the most noticeable have deemed Putin capable and willing to secure their 
particular countries with gas. So despite disagreements between other members in the European 
community and Russia they continue to reinforce their chosen course.     
The Complex Interdependence Theory suggests that common interests amongst states explain why 
cooperation exists in an anarchic world (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 118). The EU member states do 
not perceive the Nabucco Project as an internal competition. There is no discussion of ‘relative gains’ 
amongst members as common interests are the guiding principle in the EU. The fact that Eastern 
Europe via Nabucco could improve its diversification, possibly lower its gas import prices and as a 
consequence of this secure a cheaper industrial output is not a concern in the Western part of the EU. 
Since internal competition per se is not present cooperation still flourishes so this is not the reason 
why Germany and Italy among others refrain from supporting Nabucco. The answer is more likely 
found through the International Society Theory. The interaction level reached in the EU bloc suggests 
that states do have an understanding of the predicament of other states or else the solidarity clause 
would not have been formed. But statespeople in the EU member states have to juggle with various 
energy-related responsibilities simultaneously. Energy security in the EU is a national responsibility 
where the individual members first and foremost must guarantee their own import and are 
individually responsible for any diversification strategies. In the same context as is customary for the 
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EU it is encouraged to establish one’s energy security in accordance to a solidarity principle with the 
other member states. Therefore politicians of individual states will also be inclined to take notice of 
their international responsibilities in regards to the EU as a whole. The EU typically shows a 
preference for “overarching international legal frameworks” (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 245) 
but due to the lack of a common energy policy a tendency for bilateral over multilateral agreements 
have been witnessed in the EU members states energy policies.  
 
6.4 RUSSIAN “DIVIDE AND RULE”  
This section will look at Russia’s attempts to hold on to their EU clients and prevent diversification 
projects such as the Nabucco Project. To analyse the Russian strategy towards the EU it will here be 
argued that Russia it trying to aggravate the internal divide in the EU by using a so-called “divide & 
rule” approach to assist in obtaining their foreign policy goals (Umbach, 2010, p. 1237). The section 
will start by looking at the EU-Russian wrestle over up- and downstream investments in each other’s 
energy infrastructure49. Afterwards Russia’s deals with Nabucco’s transit members will be scrutinized 
and finally Russia’s own major pipeline projects to Europe will be analysed. 
The fight for gas is a “zero-sum” game and Russia is not holding back in its efforts to strengthen – or at 
least maintain - its position as a supplier to the EU (Freifeld, 2009, p. 2). As it has previously been 
mentioned most of the potential supplier countries to the Nabucco Project constitute of states that are 
of a significant interest to Russia geopolitically. Moscow has neither been subtle with its rhetoric or 
with its actions in regards to obtaining new energy assets in the EU, or securing and maintaining its 
favourable bilateral partnerships with key member states. Russia is exploiting the fact that there is a 
divide between EU member states.  
In particular Germany, Austria and Italy are the pivotal members that make up the foundation of the 
Russian “Divide and Rule” political-energy strategy towards the EU (Christie, 2009, pp. 15-16). 
Germany has had a good trade relationship with Russia since the Cold War where West Germany 
traded gas with the USSR. France is a major influencing power in the EU framework and at the core of 
the EU’s decision-making. The close Franco-German cooperation is arguably the leading body of the 
union. Therefore France must also be considered an important element to the prospect of Russian 
success with its “Divide and Rule” strategy. A good relationship with Western Europe and a dependent 
                                                             
49 ”energy infrastructure” is here interpreted as both energy companies as well as pipelines, LNG plants, 
distribution networks, refineries and so on. 
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Central Europe will keep the new members in Eastern Europe with Poland at its fore from successfully 
promoting an “avoid Russia”-discourse influencing the EU at large. In the broader sense the 
requirements of success rests on these countries as they are the largest importers of Russian gas (BP, 
2012, p. 28). Russia benefits from the previously mentioned lack of a common EU energy policy which 
leaves each member state primarily responsible for its own energy security. This situation ensures 
that the EU members resort to bilateral agreements with gas exporters instead of acting together as 
one consumer. This again facilitates the Russian strategy of influencing the EU via down- and upstream 
assets, offering companies lucrative deals and “control” Eastern Europe. The latter is often done by 
“bullying” the smaller states by way of threatening to cut off their gas supply (Cameron, 2010, p. 20). 
 
6.4.1 RUSSIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE PURCHASES IN THE EU 
This sub section will analyse Russia’s purchases in EU energy infrastructure and argue that this puts 
Russia in a position to veto the EU’s current and future diversification plans. Russia has used several 
overt as well as covert ways of gaining influence in European energy companies allegedly resorting to 
methods such as shell companies, bribes and threats (Christie, 2009, pp. 13-16).  
Gazprom’s place in the EU market is mostly based on alliances with major gas companies in France, 
Germany and Italy. These states have sold off assets to Gazprom in exchange for access to Russia’s gas 
supply (Baev & Øverland, 2010, p. 1081) and Russia has investments in at least 16 of the EU’s 27 
member states (Lucas, 2008, p. 214). EU energy companies has similarly tried using ‘upstream 
investments’ i.e. purchasing shares in Gazprom’s gas infrastructure to gain some influence in Russia’s 
energy market. Both parties have attempted to legislate on the extent of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in their energy sector(s) to stop the other from gaining market influence. The following will look 
at Russia’s investments in Europe – the so-called ‘downstream investments’ and the attempts by both 
the EU and Russia to stop the investments in one another’s energy infrastructure.  
Russia’s European energy strategy involves penetrating the market inside the European Union 
through downstream investments in distribution and storage resources, and through the use of a 
complex and obscure network of gas trading companies. (Christie, 2009, p. 13). Russia is securing its 
position in Europe by buying up shares of energy companies and of energy infrastructure. Most 
notably they have obtained a 30% share of the Central European Gas Hub (CEGH) in Baumgarten An 
Der March, Austria (Freifeld, 2009, p. 7). The CEGH is one of the major energy hubs in Europe as well 
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as the proposed destination point for Nabucco’s gas. Recent attempts by Gazprom to increase their 
share to 50% became thwarted by the EU Commission (Reuters, 2011). 
Russian companies have made several investments in European energy companies in an effort to 
control the development of the European energy markets. Some of these investments are made 
through shell companies which make it difficult for legislators to stop. An example of these 
investments is the Russian energy company Surgutneftegaz’ investments in the Hungarian energy 
giant MOL – a Nabucco consortium member. Surgutneftegaz is privately owned but has strong ties to 
Russian president Vladimir Putin which makes analysts believe it to be under the control of the 
Kremlin (Butler, 2011, p. 641). Were they to get a controlling stake in MOL that would obviously put 
Russia in a position to pull MOL out of the Nabucco Project and thus likely prevent it from leaving the 
development stage (Freifeld, 2009, p. 7). 
 
6.4.1.1 EU LAW PROHIBITING DOWNSTREAM INVESTMENTS 
The EU has tried to counter Russia’s investment moves for years. In 2006 Europe’s leaders asked the 
EU’s competition committee to investigate Gazprom’s role in the EU (Lucas, 2008, p. 214) and in 2009 
the EU instituted the ‘Third Energy Package’ which is approved by both the EU Council and the 
European Parliament. The ‘Third Energy Package’ is a set of legal measures meant to open up the 
energy markets in the EU. One of the provisions of the package states that gas infrastructure cannot be 
owned by the producer or the supplier. This is part of the EU’s ‘unbundling’ policy which is targeted at 
avoiding vertical integration but Gazprom argues this is a direct discrimination against them. The 
decision limits Gazprom’s ability to buy up infrastructure in the EU and they have requested 
exemption from the policy (Baev & Øverland, 2010, p. 1081).  
In the fall of 2011 European Union investigators raided Gazprom’s European offices seeking evidence 
of antitrust violations. The investigations focused on Gazprom’s partner companies as there was 
suspicion of Gazprom running a supply cartel (White & Shiryaevskaya, Bloomberg, 2011). 
Russia’s counterpoint to the EU’s third energy package has been to make it hard for EU investors to 
invest in Russian energy infrastructure. It has imposed strict restrictions on FDI in “strategic 
industries” which the energy sector is classified as (Christie, 2009, p. 13). Russia has also for years 
threatened to expel western energy companies from Russia. The strategy is however most likely a bluff 
as Russia needs the know-how as well as the capital influx from FDI (Lucas, 2008, pp. 214-15). Still, the 
EU will need to remedy the situation and keep Gazprom from obtaining ownership of too much 
European energy infrastructure or else Russia will improve its already considerable influence in the 
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EU energy market. It could possibly alter the interdependence between the EU and Russia to Moscow’s 
advantage (Umbach, 2011, p. 91). 
 
6.4.2 NORD STREAM PROJECT 
In the following sections the two pipeline projects Nord Stream and South Stream will be scrutinized. 
The two projects though are very different in nature and purpose even though they both assist in 
Russia’s “divide and rule” strategy. Given the two projects various differences and impact on the EU 
the Nord-Stream Project will be examined first and then the next section will look closer into 
Nabucco’s real contender South Stream.  
The Nord Stream Project is a twin pipeline system running from Vyborg in Russia to Lubmin in 
Germany, crossing the Finnish, and Swedish EEZ’s50 and Danish territorial waters in the process. The 
first of the two pipes was established in 2011 and the second pipe was completed in April 2012 and 
the whole system is expected to run at full capacity in late 2012  (Nord Stream AG, 2011). Nord Stream 
has an annual capacity of 55 bcm of 
natural gas51 and it is being run by a 
consortium consisting of shareholders 
from Russia, Germany France and 
Holland with Gazprom holding a 
controlling share (Lucas, 2008, p. 216). 
The remaining shares are divided 
between E.ON Ruhrgas and Wintershall 
Holding from Germany, Nederlandse 
Gasunie from Holland and GDF Suex from 
France  (Nord Stream AG, 2011). 
The project has been somewhat controversial and for various reasons has resulted in much political 
debacle from several EU members, be it security concerns – such as the case with Sweden (Whist, 
2008, p. 2), environmental concern in Denmark (Sanderson, 2012), worries over loss of transit 
                                                             
50 “Exclusive Economic Zone”. It is a term from the UNCLOS stipulating that a sea zone that falls within a coastal 
state’s jurisdiction gives the state special rights to exploration, navigation and laying of submarine cables and 
pipelines (United Nations, 1982). 
51 The most recent development is a discussion of expanding the original two pipes into four with a maximum 
capacity of 110 bcm (Hromadko, 2012). The expansion is still in talks but if completed it would greatly expand 
Russia’s export opportunities to the EU. 
FIGURE 6-3 NORD STREAM ROUTE (NORD STREAM AG, 
2011) 
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revenues as is the case with Poland and Ukraine, and lastly outrage over the nepotism scandals that 
has followed the project especially in Germany. 
Nord Stream bypasses Ukraine and Poland as transit countries.  Circumventing the Ukraine is essential 
for Russia since the Russian influence in the Ukraine is waning.52 Russia hopes with the construction of 
Nord Stream to re-establish themselves as a stable supplier to the EU.  
The backers of the Nord-Stream advocate for the pipeline as being more than a bilateral Russo-
German project and instead a European project aimed at ensuring energy supply to the entire EU. They 
are thereby hinting that Ukraine is an unreliable transit country and that they are to blame for the gas 
disruptions of 2006 and 2009. The pipeline is also meant to meet the EU’s rising gas demands by 
giving it direct access to Russia’s vast Shtokman fields in the north (Whist, 2010, p. 171;175). 
The project’s detractors point out that the pipeline does not help Europe’s diversification efforts; on 
the contrary it makes the EU even more dependent on Russian gas (Whist, 2010, pp. 172-174). 
Countries such as Poland and the Baltic States have also accused Germany of putting its own interests 
over the interests of other member states (Cameron, 2010, p. 22). 
 
6.4.2.1 RUSSIA-GERMANY 
Nord Stream links Russian gas directly into Germany and though some of the gas is meant to be 
shipped onward from Germany Nord Stream is in some ways considered the embodiment of Russia’s 
strong gas relationship with Germany. Of the 55 bcm scheduled to run through Nord Stream the bulk 
of it is earmarked for German consumption (Whist, 2010, p. 175). 
The Russo-German deal about the pipeline was also subject to criticism after then-Chancellor of 
Germany Gerhard Schröder gave Russia a £1 billion loan guarantee just days before leaving office and 
consequently became chairman of the Nord Stream consortium (Lucas, 2008, p. 215). As mentioned 
earlier this was a huge scandal at the time in Germany. Gerhard Schröder went to extremes in regards 
to securing the Nord Stream pipeline as he clearly stood to gain from it personally (Freifeld, 2009, pp. 
1-2).  
Germany is planning to shut down several of its nuclear plants because of the Fukushima disaster 
which will greatly reduce its electricity producing capabilities (Whist, 2010, p. 176). This has made 
Nord Stream a priority for Germany as it needs extra gas as a substitute and as mentioned earlier the 
current Chancellor Angela Merkel initially vetoed EU funding for Nabucco to secure EU support for 
                                                             
52 See subsection 5.1.3.4”The Russo-Ukrainian Gas Conflicts” 
 78 Analysis of the factors that are delaying the Nabucco Project 
Nord Stream (Barysch, 2010, p. 5). The situation reveals several things – foremost that in order for 
Nabucco to receive broad political support the major EU members need to be satisfied. In this case 
Nabucco was stalled for the sake of Nord Stream although it is possible that Germany simply desires 
both options instead of being limited to the one. In any case that is the very definition of 
diversification.  
Looking at it as a discussion within the EU, Nord Stream has put focus on the fact that Germany is in a 
close relationship with Russia and this relationship is only growing stronger with the construction of 
Nord Stream. Germany actively seeks to further the economic interdependence with Russia for 
reasons of national (energy) security (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 104). Critics fear that the 
relationship with Russia could be favoured over EU cooperation on future projects such as Nabucco. 
The fear relates to the notion that energy security is seen as a requirement for the individual member 
state. This leads countries like Germany to take a unilateral approach instead of an action in solidarity 
with the rest of the union. So while Nord Stream does not directly conflict with Nabucco as a project, 
Nord Stream has helped increase the divide in the EU and made new pipeline projects seem less 
important to member states of influence in the EU, such as Germany. 
 
6.4.3 SOUTH STREAM PROJECT 
Russia’s South Stream Project will be scrutinized below. The pipeline is a clear competitor to Nabucco 
and to the EU’s co-called “Southern Corridor” strategy. 
The South Stream 
Project is a pipeline 
project proposed by 
Gazprom. The pipeline’s 
route has yet to be 
clearly defined, but it is 
expected to run from 
Russia through the Black 
Sea into Bulgaria and 
from there through 
Serbia and Hungary to 
Baumgarten An Der 
FIGURE 6-4SOUTH STREAM AND NABUCCO ROUTES (FREIFELD, 2009, P. 3) 
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March in Austria (See Figure 6-4) where it terminates (South Stream Transport AG, 2009).  Another 
planned route is through Greece and the Adriatic Sea to Italy. Gazprom has not yet officially announced 
from where South Stream will get its gas but it is expected that roughly half of it will be Russian gas 
while the rest will come from Caspian suppliers such as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. 
The South Stream Pipeline is an extremely ambitious project. South Stream is the primary competitor 
to the Nabucco Project and a challenge to all possible EU ‘Southern Corridor’ projects. At an estimated 
price of €25 billion53 it would be one of the most expensive infrastructure projects ever undertaken 
(Barysch, 2010, p. 15). Furthermore the budget was not adjusted when South Stream in 2009 was 
increased from 30 bcm to 63 bcm possibly making it much more expensive to build (Baev & Øverland, 
2010, p. 1084). Cost estimates are very doubtful so early in a project stage but there is little doubt that 
the long off shore section under the Black Sea will be very expensive and the main reason for the high 
price tag (Baev & Øverland, 2010, p. 1076). Corruption in the Russian energy sector is apparently 
common knowledge but presents a problem if South Stream aims to keep construction cost down. It is 
estimated that every kilometre of pipeline laid by Gazprom cost as high as 3 million dollars compared 
to a world average price of 1-1.5 million dollars per kilometre laid (Shleifer & Treisman, 2011, p. 127). 
The cost as well as the impressive capacity of 63 bcm is why some sceptics are seeing South Stream as 
a dubious project.  
South Stream is seen as purely being a political move by Russia (Barysch, 2010, p. 15).  The project 
could fulfil two objectives for Russia. First of all South Stream, like Nord Stream, helps Gazprom bypass 
Ukraine as a transit country. As was previously discussed this would be important for Russia to re-
establish its image as a stabile supplier.  The political uncertainties in Ukraine are no longer acceptable 
to Russia and requires pipeline restructuring as too much is at stake. This course of action is taken 
despite Ukraine has re-elected the Russia-friendly Viktor Yanukovych as their president and Ukraine 
may subsequently allow Gazprom to buy control of Ukraine’s pipelines (Barysch, 2010, p. 15). 
Secondly, if it is built South Stream would most likely mean the end of the Nabucco Project. South 
Stream’s announced capacity of 63 bcm dwarfs the 31 bcm of Nabucco and most experts foresee that 
only one of these pipelines is going to be built. It is hard to see a scenario where both pipelines are 
built for even though half of South Stream is supplied by Russian gas it would be hard to find a 
combined 63 bcm of gas in the Middle East and/Caspian54.  
The South Stream Project does not seem feasible on paper but this will not necessarily keep Gazprom 
from building it (Barysch, 2010, p. 16). Considering the stakes Russia would most likely be willing to 
                                                             
53 Nabucco’s budget is comparably only estimated at around €12 billion (Barysch, 2010, p. 5) 
54 See section 6.2 
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take a loss of several billion euros on South Stream in order to maintain its position as dominant 
supplier to the EU. The goal of Russia as a supplier is to maximise its profits long-term so even if South 
Stream as a project does not yield a profit in itself it is not necessarily unsustainable. Not only would 
South Stream’s completion probably write of Nabucco as a project but it would give Russia flexibility 
and make them able to shift excess capacity between Nord and South Stream and in the event of  
future problems with transit countries it could bypass those without hurting other clients. In that 
perspective South Stream could make sense even if it would take a long time before it became 
profitable (Christie, 2009, pp. 18-19).  
Gazprom’s partner on South Stream is the Italian energy company ENI.  The fact that the Italian energy 
champion is the co-developer of South Stream further hampers a joint EU Nabucco Project from taking 
shape. Especially since Italy would have more to gain directly by being a partner in the South Stream 
Project than by supporting Nabucco. That said, Paolo Scaroni, the chief executive from ENI in March 
2010 suggested that Nabucco and South Stream could be merged. But Gazprom quickly refused this 
idea (Barysch, 2010, p. 16). It is unknown why the proposal was made by ENI – it could have been 
worries over the massive scale of South Stream or worries that Gazprom could not afford it or simply 
an attempt to lower competition and enhance cooperation for the benefit of all parties.  
 
6.4.4 RUSSIA’S DEALS WITH NABUCCO CONSORTIUM MEMBERS 
Russia has offered lucrative deals to some EU members and put pressure on others with potential 
threats of cutting off gas and it has with this strategy attempted to promote South Stream as an 
alternative to Nabucco (Cameron, 2010, p. 20). As mentioned South Stream is planned to go through 
Turkish waters, pass through both Bulgaria and Hungary, and may have a leg terminating in Austria. 
These are all countries that Nabucco is scheduled to run through and Gazprom has already made 
several preliminary deals with Nabucco consortium members like Bulgarian Bulgargaz, Hungarian 
MOL, Austrian OMV and Turkish Botaş (Baev & Øverland, 2010, p. 1076) all of which are - at least 
partially -state-owned companies. The strategy continues the trend of splitting up the EU and Nabucco 
through bilateral interaction with member states (Barysch, 2010, p. 15). Russia is hereby trying to 
outbid the EU and shift the transit countries away from Nabucco. Some of Nabucco’s consortium 
members such as Bulgaria are very dependent on Russian gas and Bulgaria has essentially put their 
energy system in the hands of Russia. They are not in a position to refuse deals with Gazprom. If they 
do so they have been threatened by gas cut offs which they cannot afford (Freifeld, 2009, pp. 6-7). 
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South Stream may not make much sense from a business perspective. But Russia is very intent on 
keeping the EU from diversifying through Nabucco (Christie, 2009, p. 13)and South Stream is an 
essential foreign policy tool in the struggle to retain Russia’s “security of demand” – which Putin has 
declared a prioritized principle for Russia (Baev & Øverland, 2010, p. 1079; 1084). Exports to the EU 
account for 90% of Russia’s total gas exports (Paillard, 2010) and they cannot afford to lose market 
shares to Nabucco or anyone else. Moscow has outplayed the EU on several occasions in this case but 
they are in a predicament. If Nabucco is built in the original or lesser form it will be a success for the 
EU and a blow to the Kremlin with long term effects; If Russia succeeds in preventing the construction 
of the project they will at the very best have kept the status quo infrastructure wise but at a high price. 
 
6.4.5 PART-CONCLUSION 
In contrast to the ‘society of states’ in the EU the notion of a ‘system of states’ is apparent when 
discussing the EU-Russian cooperation. It even appears to be more of a selective friendship bordering 
to favouritism in some cases. Member states such as Germany and Italy have made close bilateral ties 
to Russia even on a personal level between its leadership (Freifeld, 2009, pp. 1-2). History also 
suggests why Germany and Russia has so close ties it is not only due to personal relations (Lucas, 
2008, p. 222). Most likely as a consequence of these circumstances energy companies from these EU 
countries seem to have an easier access to cooperate alongside Gazprom on large projects in the 
otherwise restrictive Russian energy sector. Other EU members from Eastern Europe are bound to 
Russia more out of a strict necessity (BP, 2012, p. 28). Moscow has thus far succeeded in its “divide 
and rule” strategy keeping the EU from uniting on common energy projects such as Nabucco that could 
alter the status quo.   
Post-war Germany has become a successful ‘trading state’ which has down-prioritised high military 
expenditure and economic self-sufficiency. Instead German foreign policy has rested on the idea of 
international division of labour which Nord Stream is an excellent example on and on a pursuit of 
increased interdependence. The idea is that economic interdependence will lead to political 
integration and continued peace. (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, pp. 103-4). That would suggests why 
Germany and possibly Italy instead of following a trend of diversification away from Russia via 
Nabucco as advocated by the UK, Eastern Europe and the Commission instead seeks further 
cooperation with Russia.  
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In 2010 the chief executive of ENI - the Italian energy firm cooperating with Gazprom - on Gazprom’s 
alternative South Stream Project suggested a merger with Nabucco. Some EU officials have even 
spoken of similar notions suggesting that Gazprom should become member of the Nabucco consortium 
(Barysch, 2010, pp. 15-16). It can only be speculated why these suggestions have been made but 
regardless of the reasoning the EU Commissions idea of a “Southern Corridor” is the exemption of 
Russian involvement and Russian gas. That must be the criteria for success as Russia is the EU’s 
“Eastern Corridor” and it is not the direction of the gas per see but the origin of the gas that is the 
measure when discussing diversification. A suggestion from Moscow that South Stream should be a 
vital part in the new energy corridor (Baev & Øverland, 2010, p. 1088) is therefore absurd in a 
diversification context.  
 
6.5 THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT HAVE INFLUENCED THE 
NABUCCO PIPELINE 
In order to broaden the scope on the energy situation in the EU and thereby its interdependence with 
Russia it will be argued that certain global events not only have affected the Nabucco Project’s 
timetable but may also have challenged the necessity for new pipeline projects in general. 
 
6.5.1 THE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN 2008 
The world economy took a big blow in 2008 with the crash of the stock and housing market.  The 
world economy was hit effecting global demand. The global financial crisis was followed by the 
“Eurozone crisis” which saw several of the EU’s national economies falter and some countries may 
eventually have to default on their loans. Gas consumption in Europe fell by over 6% from 2008 to 
2009. Demand recovered in 2010 but fell again in 2011, this time by almost 10% (BP, 2012, p. 23). 
This is the largest drop in demand ever recorded by BP in over 60 years (BP, 2012, p. 4)and it has sent 
EU consumption below 450 bcm for the first time in over a decade.  
The drop in demand has put several countries in a predicament. The “take-or-pay”55 clause in the long-
term contracts that Russia has with EU companies has left some countries with no option but to 
purchase more gas than they needed. Russia has seen the ‘take-or-pay’ clause as the only way for them 
                                                             
55 The “take-or-pay” clause is a contract clause that stipulates that the gas importer buys a certain amount of gas 
every year or pay the exporter a specified amount (Creti & Villeneuve, 2004, pp. 75-76).  
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to keep stability in their economy when gas demand fluctuated (Baev & Øverland, 2010, p. 1080). It is 
however important to note that the ‘take-or-pay’ clause is not unusual but a clause often put into 
contracts in the European market. Russia does however also apply a ‘final destination clause’ to its 
bilateral agreements with EU countries which specifies that the importer cannot resell its gas to a third 
party. When demand in a country drops the two clauses combined leave the nation with excess gas 
that it is contractually forbidden to sell to other countries (Creti & Villeneuve, 2004). This was mostly 
the case with Russia’s Eastern European clients. Gazprom showed more flexibility towards other 
major EU companies such as Italy’s ENI where prices were lowered to make them closer to the spot 
prices in the gas market  (Łoskot-Strachota, 2010). The situation still left the Eastern European market 
with an oversupply of natural gas in the years following the financial crisis. 
The financial crisis has also hurt several of the major energy companies in the EU economically 
including several of Nabucco’s consortium members. Especially the Austrian OMV have  found it 
difficult to raise the funds needed for Nabucco’s construction in a time where banks are extremely 
cautious on loans (Baev & Øverland, 2010, p. 1083).  
 
6.5.2 THE DEVELOPMENTS IN SHALE GAS 
Shale gas is a new development in the global natural gas market. Shale gas is an unconventional gas 
form that can be found in porous rock formations and there have been significant technological 
advancements in the development of shale in recent years. Some estimate that shale gas in time could 
rise to as much as 40% of the global gas reserves (Johnson T. , 2011) while others believe that the 
amount of unconventional gas could be nearly twice the size of the reserves of conventional gas in the 
world (Umbach, 2011, p. 87). Either way, shale gas is a game changer. 
Shale gas is controversial because of the ‘fracking’56 technique that is needed to extract it from the rock 
formations and there have been many environmental protests over its emergence as a prominent 
energy source. Nonetheless it has grown to an important part of mainly the US market in just a few 
years. The United States is the biggest gas consumer in the world annually consuming between 650 to 
700 bcm in recent years (BP, 2012, p. 22). The American gas industry was in a steady decline in the 
early 2000’s and with production decreasing the US needed upwards of a 100 bcm annually to meet its 
demand making it the largest importer of LNG gas in the world. Shale gas has all but eradicated the US’ 
                                                             
56 ”fracking” means blasting the porous rock formations with water and chemicals to break the rock and release 
the gas. The chemicals are toxic and the technique is hard to control so flammable natural gas has been known to 
escape into the water supply in residential areas (Umbach, 2011, p. 88). 
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import dependency in just over five years (Rogers, 2011) and the US now has enough gas for at least 
the next decade or two. The United States annual natural gas production has risen with almost 100 
bcm in ten years and the US could soon become a net exporter of gas (Umbach, 2011, p. 87).  
Unconventional gas in Europe is another x-factor in the EU’s import demand as the EU has large 
pockets of shale gas reserves like the US. But Europe also has a higher population density and stricter 
licensing rules than in the United States which makes it unknown how much of the shale reserves can 
actually be mined (Barysch, 2010, p. 16) and whether the EU even wants to do so. France has already 
banned the controversial “fracking” technique used to recover shale gas (Umbach, 2011, p. 88)and it is 
debated all over the EU. 
There are estimated to be massive reserves of shale gas in countries like Poland and the UK 
(Macalister, 2011). Poland is one of the more gas import dependent countries in the EU and it gets 
over 60% of its gas from Russia (BP, 2012, p. 28). Poland needs to lessen its dependence on Russian 
gas and it has therefore been one of Nabucco’s biggest proponents. Increasing the country’s own gas 
production would of course be even more beneficial and the shale gas reserves were a welcome 
discovery. The extent of Poland’s shale gas reserves is still questionable (Baev & Øverland, 2010, p. 
1082) and though the extraction has already begun it has had limited success. Poland’s gas sector is 
not as well-developed as the one in the US and the expertise needed to extract shale is not present 
(Strzelecki, 2012).  
Shale gas production in Europe has so far made little impact and this is unlikely to change anytime 
soon. The development in the US shale production has however had a major impact on the world’s 
natural gas prices as the LNG it used to import e.g. from Qatar has since 2009 been diverted into 
Europe, further flooding an already saturated market. This has sent short-term gas prices plummeting 
prompting the question of whether Europe will need another gas pipeline (Barysch, 2010, pp. 3-4).  
 
6.5.3 THE EMERGENCE OF LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS (LNG) 
Liquefied Natural gas – or LNG – is another factor that has changed the natural gas market.  LNG 
became steadily cheaper up through the 1990’s and early 2000’s as the technology was developed and 
made more cost effective (Jensen Associates, 2007, p. 15).   LNG is not bound to pipelines and is not 
always subject to the same long-term contracts as pipeline gas. This means that LNG trading more 
simulates  oil which uses a global price. LNG has not attained a global price yet but it is expected to 
move in that direction (Umbach, 2010, p. 1232). 
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With the US becoming more or less self-sufficient the gas produced in countries such as Qatar could be 
diverted to Europe. Qatar is shipping more than 100 bcm annually and already sells around 40 bcm to 
the EU. The development of LNG in the European markets created a short-term oversupply of gas but 
this has been lessened to some extent by the Fukushima disaster in Japan in 2011. The breakdown of 
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant has sent Japan’s LNG imports up to record levels and this has 
levelled out the LNG market (Sethuraman, 2011). Japan imported 107 bcm in 2011 which is a 15% 
increase over 2010 (BP, 2012, p. 28) and Japanese imports are expected to rise even higher in 2012. 
Europe has experienced an oversupply of LNG which has depressed the market but this is expected to 
be short-term. LNG is an option for diversification 
even though it is a more expensive solution, at least 
for the next decade or two.. LNG supplies can also 
be used to help stabilize the market in case of gas 
cut offs like the ones Eastern Europe experienced 
during the Russia-Ukraine disputes of 2006 and 
2009  (Umbach, 2010, p. 1236) although it would 
require more installed interconnectors to be fully 
effective for the entire EU. In any case LNG must for 
now be considered less attractive than pipeline gas 
because of the higher price. For even though 
pipeline gas has a high infrastructure construction cost the maintenance costs of the pipelines are very 
low and this makes pipelines more cost effective long-term. Still the sudden extra supply of LNG in the 
last few years has lessened the need for Nabucco in the eyes of investors as well as policy makers 
(Barysch, 2010, p. 4). 
 
6.5.4 NABUCCO WEST 
With all the mounting problems for Nabucco, a new possible solution surfaced in the summer of 2012. 
The Nabucco consortium proposed an alternative pipeline to Nabucco called “Nabucco West”. It is 
essentially a shorter version of the original Nabucco Project. Nabucco West will run the same route 
from Austria through the EU but it will end at the Bulgarian-Turkish border unlike the original 
Nabucco Pipeline that stopped at the Georgian-Turkish border. The initial capacity of Nabucco West is 
only 10 bcm but it is scalable and is designed to meet further increases in supply (Socor 2, 2012).  
LNG is natural gas that is cooled 
down to a temperature of just 
under -162°C at which point the 
gas changes to a liquid state 
(CLNG, 2012). This compresses 
the gas and makes it easier to 
transport. LNG is the 
technology used when 
transport gas over sea or 
where a pipeline is not a viable 
option. 
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Nabucco West will be supplied with gas by the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP). TANAP is a 
collaboration of Turkey’s Botaş and TPAO as well as Azerbaijan’s SOCAR with Georgia as a transit 
country.  TANAP is also scalable and has a potential capacity of 30 bcm, almost equal to the original 
Nabucco plans (Socor 2, 2012). Nabucco West is only a proposition but it has received a positive 
reaction from Azerbaijan. BP has agreed to supply gas to Nabucco West from the BP-run Shaz Deniz II 
gas field off the coast of Azerbaijan. This decision also meant that BP has scrapped its plans for the 
South-East European Pipeline (SEEP) which was otherwise considered a strong competitor to Nabucco 
(Agayev & Schneeweiss, 2012). 
Nabucco’s capacity has been subject to much debate. Some have said that a 31 bcm pipeline was much 
too ambitious and too expensive to build while others have pointed out that 31 bcm is too little to 
make a difference to the EU’s gas dependency (Barysch, 2010, p. 6). Nabucco West is the same capacity 
as the original plans but shorter which makes it cheaper to build. This solution - much shorter, cheaper 
and with a scalable capacity – can therefore be seen as a compromise between the two that may make 
it less problematic to complete.  
 
6.5.5 PART-CONCLUSION 
The recent international developments in the European and US gas market have lowered the need for 
new gas projects. The spot market prices for gas in Europe have plummeted because of unexpected 
LNG gas from the Qatar and a drop in demand brought on by the financial crisis. 
Shale gas in Europe is probably unlikely to become a big factor but the advances in the US have meant 
that the global gas production has risen sharply. When this is combined with the global increases in 
LNG trade it gives Europe access to new sources of gas without the added construction costs of new 
pipeline projects. In a time where the European economy is struggling it makes new projects seem like 
a very unnecessary endeavour. This has strengthened the arguments for Nabucco’s critics and 
Nabucco could arguably be seen as superfluous. This view is however a little short-sighted as the 
surplus LNG from the Middle East is temporary and the market will most likely level out.  
The developments in the global gas production have in other words helped Europe diversify away 
from Russian sources without Nabucco and without any active action from the EU. It does however 
mainly help Western Europe. Without the proper pipeline infrastructure to move gas from Western 
Europe to the Eastern Europe the new EU member states will still have to rely on large imports from 
Russia. The situation again raises the question of EU solidarity in Europe. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
P R OBLE M S TA TE ME N T:   
“W HE N ANA LYS ING T HE ENER G Y IN T ER DEP E NDE N CE B E TW EEN T HE EU  A N D R U SS IA I N T H E F IE L D  
OF NA TU R A L GAS ,  T WO Q U ES TI ON S AR I SE:  “W HY H AS T HE  N ABU C CO P IP E LI NE  E ME RGE D A S A  
F LAG SHIP  P RO JE C T F OR  T HE  E U COM MI SS ION AN D WH Y HA S T HE  NAB U C C O P IP E LI NE  ST IL L NO T 
BE E N I MP LE ME N TE D? ”  
The interdependence between the EU and Russia is evident but not necessarily beneficial. The 
Nabucco Pipeline has become a flagship project for the EU Commission because of distrust in the 
reliability of Russia as a natural gas supplier.  
The strong energy interdependence between the two actors was assumed to spill-over into other 
political areas but whether this can actually happen remains to be seen. Gas was supposed to be the 
glue between the EU-27 bloc and Russia - the ‘common interest’ that binds these otherwise non-
compatible partners together. It appears however that gas is the very reason why advancement on any 
political issue seems unattainable as neither party is willing to alter their perspective on how best to 
ensure a stable flow of gas to the EU. The EU Commission desires an internal energy market where gas 
can be traded freely in a joint EU energy bloc in the hope of getting the lowest possible prices in a 
secure and diversified market. Moscow on the other hand will not loosen its monopolistic control 
methods towards the European market. The destination clauses on Gazprom’s long-term gas contracts 
and the extensive purchase of European ‘downstream assets’ are means to keep prices higher and 
possibly keep the EU locked to the Russian energy network. Moscow’s attempts at obtaining a majority 
share in one of the national energy champions of the Nabucco Consortium or signing them for the 
South Stream Project is clearly meant to halt the Nabucco Project. Russia has not become more 
westernized by interaction with the EU; instead it has misused the rules of the EU to its advantage. The 
stalemate in negotiations on the new PCA suggests that the institutions that were otherwise intended 
to assist state cooperation in an anarchic world are of little avail. This seems to conflict with the 
interdependence theory and the question is whether trade between two state actors can really be seen 
as a common interest; for even though the buyer (the EU) and seller (Russia) can both gain from their 
trade relationship they do not have a common goal.  
From the Commission’s point of view Russia’s actions are motivated by relative gains at the expense of 
the EU rather than by symbiotic development of their relationship. Russia has also let quarrels with 
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Ukraine affect their export obligations to the EU - A dispute that greatly affected the over-dependent 
Eastern part of the union. Taken in conjunction with the fact that Russia may be unable to meet the 
demands of the EU’s growing gas consumption it altogether adds to the worries and responsibilities of 
the EU officials in the Commission tasked with promoting EU interest as a whole.  
The common norms, values, and institutions shared in the EU that constitute a ‘society of states’ stand 
in stark contrast to the EU’s relationship with the Russian Federation. Their relationship resembles 
more of a ‘system of states’, a relationship marred by mistrust and calculations on one another’s 
behaviour. The Commission stands witness to a Russia that follows its energy strategy vigorously 
without consideration to other alternatives. Moscow is politically, economically and militarily 
committed to this specific foreign policy linking its near abroad interests, domestic socio-economic 
rise and its interdependence with the EU into one. Moscow’s pipeline politics is the tool with which to 
achieve its great power ambition and there is little room for error as Russia’s success is linked to this 
and this alone. Russia clearly has no intention of seeing its trade with the EU diminished. This in itself 
is problematic and the overt pressure to prevent the Nabucco Project from materialising does not go 
unnoticed in the EU. The UK and the over-dependent EU members of Eastern Europe are clearly 
worried about the excessive reliance on Russia as a supplier. Faced with a Russia that is aggressive 
when it comes to ‘security of demand’ in the EU the Commission emphasises Nabucco as the EU’s 
flagship project as a means to lower the dependence on a foreign power of questionable intent. So 
even though Nabucco will not remove the interdependence between Russia and the EU, it will lessen 
the EU’s reliance on its most powerful neighbour. 
The Nabucco Project has faced many obstacles to its possible completion. These have ranged from a 
lack of internal support in the EU to a shortage of accessible suppliers to fill its capacity of 31 bcm. The 
divide in the EU stems from a fundamental difference of opinion both in regards to the Nabucco 
Project but also about the perception of Russia. The EU is split into two groups; those who believe the 
project is vital for Europe’s energy security and those who think of it as an expensive, unnecessary 
solution to a non-existent problem. Personal political relations with Putin have also affected the 
diversification discussions about Nabucco but so too has Russia’s past with Eastern Europe as well as 
the close proximity of Russian gas. The interdependence between the EU and Russia is unlikely to 
change as some members favour diversification away from Russia while others seek closer 
cooperation. Germany in particular follows a foreign policy of broadening its cooperation with Russia 
and the Nord Stream Project is the embodiment of their close energy relationship. This course of 
action favouring bilateral agreements with Russia over Nabucco is also witnessed in Italy via Italy’s 
involvement with South Stream.  The lack of a common energy policy in the EU is most likely the main 
cause why most of the larger EU members are inclined to follow this trend. The interaction level 
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reached in the EU bloc suggests however that the states have an understanding for the predicament of 
other states or else the solidarity clause would not have been formed. But statespeople in the EU 
member states have to juggle with various energy-related responsibilities simultaneously. Energy 
security in the EU is a national responsibility where the individual members first and foremost must 
guarantee their own import and are individually responsible for any diversification strategies. Despite 
its common values, norms and institutions the EU has not managed to agree and even though Russia 
has done its part in attempting to increase the divide in the EU, the EU as a whole must be considered 
the main reason why the Nabucco Project has not been implemented and reached an actual 
construction phase.  
The Nabucco Project is likely not going to be completed – at least not in its full length. The gas market 
in Europe has changed in the last few years with the influx of LNG and the development of shale and 
the project has clearly been hindered by the divergent national interests of the member states that 
supersede the needs of the collective EU. In the end, despite the Commission advocating for Nabucco 
the diversification project is only an option for most of the EU while the project’s completion would be 
a disaster for Russia. Moscow therefore fights the Nabucco Project tooth and nail while the EU cannot 
seem to agree internally whether the project is even worth completing. 
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8 TERMINOLOGY AND ABBREVIATIONS 
MEP: Member of European Parliament. 
EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone. 
UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment.   
PCA: Partnership and Co-operation Agreement. 
ECT: Energy Charter Treaty. 
CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States. 
 
8.1 NATURAL GAS TERMINOLOGY 
bcm: Billion Cubic Metres. A unit of volume often used when measuring quantity of natural gas in 
production, consumption or trade. 
Mtoe: Million Tonnes Oil Equivalent. A term used when comparing different energy sources with one 
another. This states how many million tonnes of oil that would be needed to output the same amount 
of energy.  
LNG: Liquefied Natural Gas. A technique used to transport gas over long distances over water. It 
involves freezing the gas and thus compressing it to a transportable liquid. But the process comes at a 
high cost per cubic metre of gas and it requires special LNG plants at both the point of departure to 
condense the gas as well as at the destination point where the gas is returned to its natural vaporous 
state. 
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